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A survey of t h e  modernization l i t e r a t u r e  cannot bu t  l e a d  t h e  reader  
t o  recognize  t h e  d r u d i t y  of t h e  a n a l y t i c  formula t ions  o f f e red .  Most 
o f t e n ,  t h e  goa l  of empi r i ca l  r e s e a r c h  seems t o  be noth ing  l e s s  (and noth ing  
more) t han  t h e  es tab l i shment  of d i f f e r e n c e s  o r  s i m i l a r i t i e s  i n  a t t i t u d e s  
and s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  a t t i d u d e s  and s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  an- 
t i c i p a t e d  by modernizat ion theory .  Commonly, t h e  es tab l i shment  of d i f -  
f e r ences  l e a d s  t h e  r e sea rche r  t o  emphasize c u l t a r a l  o r  h i s t o r i c i s t  expla-  
n a t i o n s  (oar l a g  phenomena); t h e  es tab l i shment  of s i m i l a r i t i e s ,  on t h e  
o t h e r  hand, l e a d s  r e sea rche r s  t o  emphasize commonalities t h a t  a l l  s o c i e t i e s  
s h a r e  o r  t hose  commonalities t h a t  s o c i e t i e s  s h a r e  by v i r t u e  of having 
achieved a  given l e v e l  of  economic development. A good example would be 
t h e  debate  and l i t e r a t u r e  t h a t  has  grown up around t h e  s tudy of occupa- 
t i o n a l  p r e s t i g e  rankings i n  d i f f e r e n t  s o c i e t i e s  (e .g . ,  I nke le s  and Rossi  
1956; Hodge, Treiman and Ross i  1966).  
This  paper  d e a l s  w i th  t h e  concept of  f u n c t i o n a l  a l t e r n a t i v e s ;  I 
w i l l  argue t h a t ,  p rope r ly  used, t h i s  concept provides  important  leverage  
f o r  s o c i o l o g i s t s  engaged i n  comparative r e s e a r c h ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t hose  
working i n  t h e  a r e a  of  economic development and s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e .  I n  
gene ra l  f a sh ion ,  t h i s  concept has  been used t o  suggest  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  a  
range of s t r u c t u r a l  o r  va lue  arrangements t h a t  may s e r v e  t o  f u l f i l l  a  
common funct ion .  Despi te  what appears  t o  be a  growing disenchantment 
w i th  t h e  wares of s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  by contemporary s o c i o l o g i s t s ,  
even those  spokesmen f o r  a  more e m p i r i c a l l y ~ o r i e n t e d  soc io logy  cont inue 
t o  f i n d  t h e  concept of f u n c t i o n a l  a l t e r n a t i v e s  u s e f u l  (e .g . ,  Stinchcombe, 
1968: 80-125; Coleman,1969: 291-292). A s  w i l l  become apparent ,  t h e r e  
are good reasons for this. The final section of the paper will be devoted 
to examining the system of employment security dominant in large-scale 
Japanese firms to demonstrate the utility of this concept. 
We may summarize the above mentioned alternative conceptualizations 
with a typology that compares two or more societies in their response to 
modem economic growth (see F~gure 1). 
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Same Functioaal Alternatives Convergence Theory 
Historicism, as presented in Figure 1, is an argument for uniqueness in 
both structure and structural consequences. It denies attempts to formu- 
late generalizable propositions applicable to more than one society, cul- 
ture, or period. The focus is rather on the ordering of temporal events 
wlhthhccrystallize to form unique organizational and societal patterns. 
One understands the meanings of these historical experiences only by 
concentrating on relevanthhistorical events. Robert Nisbet (1969) in his 
provacative book Social Change and History comes dose to taking this position 
in his critique of macro-sociological /- 
Comparative sociologists reject the historicist view; they seek 
generalizable statements which apply to more than;,one society (Shils 
1963: 1-26; Bendix 1963: 532-39). It is expected that the historical 
experience of one society will illuminate the meanings of historical 
experiences in other societies. Ideally, these general propositions are 
not rooted in any one society; they transcend specific societies. Yet, 
they prove their utility by he$ping to explain specific empirical pro- 
cesses. 
To reject historicism is not to deny the conception of social struc- 
ture as a system of historical dimensions. Indeed, as Reinhard Bendix 
(1963: 437) suggests, comparative analysis forces us to see social 
ktructure not "as a natural system with defined limits and invariant 0 
laws governing an equilibrating process, but rather as a system of his- 
torical dimensions',",' These historical dimensions influence point of 
origin, route and temporary destinations of social structures under the 
impact of and interacting with economic development. To say that social 
structure is a system of historical dimensions means that historical 
conteat influences the operation of seemingly invariant processes such 
as industrialization and thus makes poslible a meaningful conception of 
process (c.f., Nisbet 1969; Gerschehkron 1962). The extent to which we 
can conceptualize historical processes in an intelligent fashion is 
based on our ability to separate random from nonrandom processes. As 
Boulding (1970: 16) notes, the human mind has a profound tendency towards 
suppcestition that is "the imposition of a spurious order on its obser- 
vation of random processes." 
The issue at hand is to incorporate the role of history in our con- 
cepiton of social structure without compromising the generalizing goal 
of social science. Clearly, historicism does not allow such an outcome. 
I will argue below that the concept of functional alternatives does offer 
this flexibility. 
We may now turn to a consideration of a second cell in Figure 1, 
that represented as convergence theory. Convergence theory is an argu- 
ment for the increasing similarity of structural arrangements and their 
consequenc~sLmn:hhe~~mdda8trial..aocieties. Briefly put, convergence theory 
envisions that, with advanced industrialization, unique national iden- 
tities fade and common solutions to problems of social organization come 
to prevail. Scholars more or less identified with this position are 
Clark Kerr and associates (1964), Alex Inkeles (1966) and Marion Levy 
(1966). The convergence position is ultimately a technocratic one which 
asserts that social andopolitical relationships must be sestructured to 
mesh with the complex technological organization characteristic of higher 
llevels of economic development (0. f . , Weinberg 1968 : 10) . The constraints 
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of modem technology and economic organization are seen as the center of 
a series of concentric circles which gradually impose convergence on the 
outer circles of social structure and value orientation. 
Convergence theory has not been lacking in its critics. Arnold 
Feldman and Wilbert Moore (1969) have accepted the imagery of concentric 
circles but argued that convergence is limited to the "core" elements of 
the industrial system, with all industrial societies possessing the min- 
imum characteristics of: a factory system of production, a stratification 
system based on a complex and extensive divid&mq-.~d'~lhhbrn~?and hierarchy 
of skills, an extensive commercialization of goods and services and their 
transfer through the market, and an educational system capable of filling 
the various niches in the occupatioaal and stratification system. Beyond 
these minimum core characteristics, Feldman and Moore emphasize the ele- 
ments of divergence in industrial systems. Similarly, Goldthorpe (1966: 
648-59) duns convergence theorists for adopting an exaggerated degree of 
determinism which focuses exclusively on the impact of lnaterial'exigencies 
upon social structure. Critics, in short, have attacked the assumption 
of strict functional inter-dependence among component parts and stressed 
the partial nature of solutions to problems of social organization in 
the course of economic development. 
In stressing the partial nature of solutions to problems of economic 
organization, Baddix (1964) aceepts that the industrial revolution briggs 
to bear common imperatives on industrializing aations. Yet, he emphasizes 
the way these imperatives are combined with the unique historical exper- 
iences of each country to produce an amalgam. Phis amalgam denies the 
simple applicability of one nation's experience to another. The signifi- 
cance of this position is that each successive level of industrialization 
may be seen as opening up common options and closmgg others, but the 
actual choises made by people are in terms of subtle interactions between 
these common options and the specific social, political, economic and 
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[cultural history of the contry in question. The problem with convergence 
%theory lies in its proponents' 6illingness to exaggerate the organizaa 
tional requirements of modem industrial society without recognizing the 
needs of purposive historical actors (cff Goldthorpe 1966: 648-59). 
Thus far, our discussion has focused on the two cells, historicism 
and convergence theery. 'Both represent "all or nothing" propositions and, 
as such, appear simplistic. Edward Shils (1963) argued some time ago 
that what we need are sociological concepts which both allow for societal 
uniqueness and explain it in a wider analytical framework. What his- 
toricism does is to allow for uniqueness -- historical uniqueness is 
the very basis of this formulition -- but it cannot explain it in a wider 
analy8ical framework. Convergence theory has an analygical framework, 
to be sure, but it does not allow for societal uniqueness as representdd 
by the intrusion of history. It is with these limitations in mind that 
we now turn to consider the remaining two cells. 
The first of these cells has not yet been discuesed;iit is labaaed 
structural modeling with mvironmental effects. The possibility of de- 
veloping similar structural arrangements but with different outcomes has 
not been formulated by sociologists as a ,major societal response to eco- 1 
nomic development. Nevertheless, social scientists have often pointed 
out how "modemm appearing structural arrangements in non-western societies, 
$£ten boarowed from the West, have unanticipated\cons(uqma8e$ (especially 
from a western viewpoint) that are quite different from their consequences 
in western societies (e.g., Riggs 1966: 368-371). The basis for these 
different conseqganees lies in the new structural arrangements having to 
cope with and draw resources from quite different social and even physical 
environments. The nww institutional arrangements are aften bakfgned to 
meet quite different goags; this usually leads to the diffusion of only 
selected western characteristics (with critical omissions) to meet the 
needs of native leaders. For example, the Japanese university system, 
though modeled first after the French, hrican and finally Prussian sys- 
items in the pre World War '13 period and the American system in theppost- rC 
war period, has had a number of distinctive conseppences which have not 
been shardd by kba counterparts in Western Europe and America. The 
basis for these different conseqpences lies in the quite diffdrent social 
context in which this institution appeared. Michio Nagai (1971) pro- 
vides an excellent documentation of the impact of western models of edu- 
cation in conjunction with the needs of the Japanese in prewar Japan. 
In summary, conceptualizing the relationship between economic development 
and social change in terms of structural modeling with envmfonmental 
effects appears to be a fruitful research strategy. 
This brings us to a consideration of the fourth cell, which is 
the focus of attention in this paper. We shall use the concept functional 
alternatives to refer to the empirical possibility that social units 
evolve different structural arrangements to solve common problems. In 
the past, sociologists have usdd such concepts as functional aqaivalents, 
functional alternatives, functional substitutes, and functionalaanalogues 
in rather loose and interchangeable fashion. Our discussion is intended 
to apply to all these concepts. The terms themselves invoke the languages 
of structural-functional analysis. One can make a strong argument for 
dispensing with the above terminologies and thereby dismissing the baggage 
of functional theory by sabstituting a term such as structural equiv- 
alents. But there are costs to developing new terminmlogies, one of which 
is the loss of continuity with past literature on the subject. 
The functional terminology in this case has been based on the premise 
that we can identify specific functional prerequisites of "universal 
needs" which must be performed bo permit societies to persist (Aberle s. 
a1 1950; Levy 1966: 174-187). An even more demanding version (more -. 9 
demanding in the sense of requiring more detailed specification) is that 
we can identify at varying levels of development certain functional pre- 
requisitis which must be satisfied if a society is successfully to pro- 
ceed with modernization. When these functional requirements are not met, 
further economic development or modernization will not occur. This has 
been an imp,licit assumption in much of the modernization literature based 
on the search for universal preconditions or universal obstacles to 
development.. Gerschenkron (1962: 31-51) and Hirschman (1965: 385-93) 
provide biting critiques of these assumptions. Gerschenkron shows that 
many alleged preconditions are concomitants of economic growth while 
Hirschman demonstrates that many alleged obstaches have on occasion heen 
beneficial for economic growth. 
Bor some of the early functionalists such as Malinowski (1926: 136) 
the assumption of functional indispensability was aWguous. It was not 
clear whether it was the funttion bhat was indispensable or the structural 
item fulfilling this function. This Cagueness has by no means disappeared 
as Gerschenkfon and Hirschman show. Nevertheless, leading spokesmen 
for structural-functional theory have recognized the problem. The dis- 
tinction that is now commonly made is that we may speak of.functiona1 
needs but that these needs may be met by a range of structural alternatives 
(Merton, 1957: 32-37). 
Notwithstanding these modifications, critics continue to point to 
the deficiencies of functional analysis. There is no need to rehash 
these criticisms here. (See Hempel, 1959: 211-807 for a more intensive 
treatment)) 
Those criticisms relevant to our discussion are that key terms of 
functional analysis such as need and functional prerequisite have been 
used in a nonempirical manner without providing clear operational defini- 
tions. Without a specification of how these terms can be applied to the 
empirical world they lead to no specific predictions and cannot be put 
to empirical use. Particularly important in terms of its weak explanatory 
force is that functional analysis does not provide an explanation of why 
a particular item rather than some functional alternative of it occurs 
in a given system. This is a consideration we will deal with later under 
the section, historical explanation and functional alternatives. 
These weaknesses have become increasingly clear to contemporary 
sociologists. What is needed is a way to capftalize on the strengths of 
the concept of functional alternatives kited earlier and separate it 
from the limitations just noted. To this end, I proposed that we focus 
on common problem facing societies at given levels of industrialization. 
This approach allows for universal problems such as establishment of 
factory discipline and recauitment of a labor force as well as problems 
faced by a selected numbef of societies. An example of the latter would 
be those problems which confront latecomers seeking to industrialize 
in a world already dominated by highly industrialized nations. Even 
universal problems such as recruitment of a labor force are strongly in- 
fluenced by thehhistorical timing of the industrialization (e.g,, the 
quality of the labor force changes). 
This perspective does not deny the emphasis put on imperatives of 
industrialization by convergence theorists, However,uunlike convergence 
theory which poiiits common responses to these imperatives, the functional 
alternative position is less demanddng; it posits common problems which 
may be solved by a limited range of alternative social arrangements. It 
permits us to accept societal differences without having to fall back on 
explanations based on historical uniqueness. Instead, we may incorporate 
these societal differences in a common analytic framework. 
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H i s t o r i c a l  Explanat ion and Funct iona l  A l t e r n a t i v e s  
A s  noted earlier, a  major weakness of f u n c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  is  i ts  
l a c k  of explana t ion  of why a  p a r t i c u l a r  i t e m  r a t h e r  t han  some f u n c t i o n a l  
a l t e n n a t i v e  occurs  i n  a given system. I n  cons ider ing  t h e  p e r s i s t e n c e  of 
a  given s t r u c t u r a l  p a t t e r n ,  i t  cannot be  assumed t h a t  once key dec i s ions  
l ead ing  t o  i t s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  a t  an e a r l i e r  t i m e  have been made, 
a  s o c i e t y  i s  locked i n t o  main ta in ing  t h a t  p a t t e r n .  The e s e e n t i a l  d i s -  
t i n c t i o n  t h a t  must be  made concerns t h e  way p a t t e r n s  s p e c i f i c  t o  a given 
s o c i e t y  a r i s e ,  andhhow they  may o r  may n o t  come t o  be  preserved.  To es-  
t a b l i s h  causa l  l i nkages  n e c e s s i t a t e s  a sk ing  t h r e e  ques t ions :  what a r e  
t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  set of f a c t o r s  r e spons ib l e  f o r  t h e  emergence of  t h e  p a t t e r n ;  
what a r e  t h e  s e t  of f a c t o r s  by which s o c i a l  arrangements peproduce them- 
s e l v e s ;  and t o  what e x t e n t  do t h o s e  r e sou rces  r e spons ib l e  f o r  reproduc- 
&on remain c o n t i n u a l l y  a v a i l a b l e  t o  a d j u s t  t o  changing i n t e r n a l @ n s i o n s  
$and changing env i ronaen ta l  cond i t i ons  ( c f . ,  Stinchcombe, 1968: 101-2)? 
I n  ca ses  where a  given s o c i a l  arrangement i s  preserved ,  t h e  goa l  i s  
t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between gha t  caused t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  p a t t e r n  a t  an  e a r l y  t ime 
pe r iod ,  how i t  came t o  be e s t a b l i s h e d  through a process  of p o s i t i v e  feed- 
back o r  d e v i a t i o n  amplifying feedback, and t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  s e l f  r e p l i -  
c a t i n g  causa l  loop t h a t  p re se rves  t h e  p a t t e r n  a t  a s t i l l  l a t e r  t ime per-  
iod .  The i s s u e  r a i s e d  h e r e  i s  one of h i s t o r i c a l  s e l e c t i o n ;  an  under- 
s t and ing  why one f u n c t i o n a l  a l t e r n a t i v e  and no t  ano the r  g e t s  s e l e c t e d  ou t .  
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  one must i d e n t i f y  t h e  emergence of s p e c i f i c  s o c i a l  
p r a c t i c e s  and e v a l u a t e  Ghhir consequences f o r  meeting t h e  needs of rele- 
vant a c t o r s .  We t r a c e  t h e  pa th  by which s o c i a l  arrangements t h a t  a r e  
p r e s e r ~ e d  gradual ly  elfkininate a l t e r n a t i v e  modes of organiza t ion  by t h e i r  
very success  i n  meeting s o c i a l l y  defined needs r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  f a i l u r e  
of t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  Impl i c i t  i n  t h i s  model is  t h e  l ea rn ing  process 
by which s o c i a l  a c t o r s  adopt appropr ia te  behaviors  i n  response t o  pa t te rned 
4.- $rewards and punp~hments.  Moreover, when t a k i n g  a  given a c t i o n  precludes 
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t h e  r e s u l t  of a l t e r n a t i v e  a c t i o n  foregone i n  performing t h e  f i r s t ,  t h i s  
becomes a  c o s t  which t h e  ind iv idua l  may wig$h a g a i n s t  t h e  va lue  of t h e  
rewards t o  be der ived  from taking  t h e  f i r s t  a c t i o n  (Homans 1961: 51-82). 
I n  summary, once p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  a  s o c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  f i n d  they ge t  s a t i s -  
f ac to ry  r e s u l t s  from s p e c i f i c  behavior p a t t e r n s ,  c e t e r i s  par ibus ,  t h e  
s e l e c t i v e  p r i n c i p l e  encouraging a  search f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  i s  
weakened (Stinchcombe 1968: 105). Soc io log i s t s  can b e n e f i t  from t h e  
economists' pe r spec t ive  on opportunity c o s t s .  The ques t ion  t o  be con- 
s ide red  i s  what a r e  t h e  c o s t s  incurred  by adopting a  p a r t i c u l a r  s o c i a l  
arrangement a s  compared t o  some o the r  f u n c t i o n a l  a l t e r n a t i v e  (Olson:1970: 
123) . 
I n  any d i scuss ion  of t h e  b i s t o r i d a l  evo lu t ion  of func t iona l  a l t e r -  
n a t i v e s  w e  must s p e c i f i c a l l y  examine t h e  degree of awareness of t h e  r e l e -  
vant  a c t o r s  of t h e  problems t o  be solved,  t h e  ex ten t  t o  which thpy a r e  
aware of a l t e r n a t i v e  s o l u t i o n s  and c o n s t r a i n t s  on borrowing. Lack of 
awareness of theppboblem t o  be solved and/or a l t e r n a t i v e  so lu t ions  may, 
i n  i t s e l f ,  be a  powerful f a c t o r  s e l e c t i n g  f o r  one func t iona l  a l t e r n a t i v e  
r a t h e r  t han  another .  It i s  o f t e n  noted t h a t  cumulat ive h i s t o r i c a l  ex- 
p e r i e n c e  w i t h  modem economic growth has  given t h e  contemporary t h i r d  
world states a weal th  of a l t e r n a t i v e s  from which t o  choose i n  so lv ing  
problems r e l a t i n g  t o  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n .  Y e t ,  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  exper ience  
of a country a l s o  imposes c o n s t r a i n t s  on choice.  A major example i s  
1 9 t h  century  eh ina ,  which by v i r t u e  of t h e  self- image of i t s  e l i t e  saw 
China a s  t h e  c e n t e r  of t h e  world, w i th  o u t s i d e r s  having  barbbr ian  s t a t u s .  
Consequently,  i t  was extremely d i f f i c u l t  f o r  t h e  Chinese t o  borrow tech-  
nology and e s p e c i a l l y  form of  s o c i a l  o rgan iza t ion  from t h e  West. The 
use  of Sovie t  i n d u s t r i a l  exper ience  by contemporary Chinese l e a d e r s  a s  
a n e g a t i v e  model i s  s i m i l a r  i n  t h e s e  r e s p e c t s .  General ly  speaking,  
t h e  ambiguity of contemporary t h i r d  world n a t i o n s  toward borrowing from 
t h e i r  ex-colonia l  r u l e r s  sugges t  s i m i l a r  cons t r iAn t s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  much 
of t h e  accumulated m a t i e f a l  s t o c k  of t r a n s n a t i o n a l  resources  may no t  be 
r e l e a a n t  f o r  backward economies. Simon Kuznets makes a d i s t i n c t i o n  
between t o t a l  s t o c k  of t r a n s n a t i o n a l  resources  and t h e  r e l e v a n t  sbbck of 
t r a n s n a t i o n a l  resources  (Kuznets 1868). Th i s  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  r e l e v a n t  i n  
t h e  area of technology. I n  summary, t h e  e x t e n t  of  awareness of problems 
and awareness of a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  a long  wi th  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
t h a t  v a r i o u s  a l t e r n a t i v e s  have ba being  accepted a r e  important  ques t ions  
t o  be examined by r e sea rche r s .  
S t r u c t u r a l  f u n c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  a r o s e  i n  p a r t  a s  a cha l lenge  t o  evolu- 
4 t i o n a r y  theory .  A s  a consejlqnce a n o t a b l e  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  d ispense  w i t h  
. . 
h i s t o r i c a l  exp lana t ions  had been t h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of  many s t r u c t u r a l -  
f u n c t i o n a l i s t s  and l e d  t o  t h e  charge t h a t  t h e  theo ry  was a h i s t o r i c a l .  It 
is  t r u e  t h a t  h i s t o r i c a l  causes  a r e  contained i n  t h e  state of c u r r e n t  
i n t e r a c t i o n s  by v i r t u e  of having shaped them. It i s  a l s o  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  
op t ions  open t o  any i n d i v i d u a l  i n  a  given s o c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  a r e  determined 
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$by t h e  s t a t e  of  c u r r e n t  i n t e r a c t i o n s  and t h e i r  r u l e s .  0' Based on t h i s  
understanding,  many s o c i o l o g i s t s  have concent ra ted  on exp la in ing  t h e  ex- 
i s t e n c e  of a  g iven  s t r u c t u r a l  i t e m  i n  terms of i t s  p r e s e n t  consequences 
f o r  o t h e r  i t e m s  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e .  
Yet ,  t h e  op t ions  open t o  contemporary a c t o r s  are a l s o  h i s t o r i c a l  
outcomes and t h e  way we come t o  understand them i s  by undersaamddmggtheir 
h i s t o r i c a l  development. The u l t i m a t e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h i s  i n t e p p r e t a t i o n  
i s  based on t h e  view t h a t  every h i s t o r i c a l  event  t h a t  t a k e s  p l a c e ,  i n  
p r i n c i p l e ,  shapes t h e  course  of  subsequent events .  What i s  important  
h e r e  is  n o t  on ly  t h a t  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  behav io ra l  options~.are..historical 
ourtomes. An i n d i v i d u a l ' s  Hpast h i s t o r y  of succees  i n  h i s  a c t i v i t i e s  
under given circumstances determines whether he  w i l l  , t r y  them aga in ,  o r  
o t h e r s  l i k e  them, i n  similar circumstances" (Homans 1967: 90) .  
I n  p r a c t i c e ,  however, many ques t ions  about c u r r e n t  i n t e r a c t i o n s  can 
be  answered t h a t  do n o t  r e q u i r e  h i s t o r i c a l  exp lana t ions .  I f  we want t o  
know t h e  p re sen t  impact of r e l i g i o n  on p a r t y  p r&fe rence ,  we do no t  need 
t o  invoke h i s t o r i c a l  explana t ion .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  h i s t o r i c a l  exp lana t ion  
semes as an " i n d i r e c t  cause," whic'h i s  conta ined  i n  t h e  c u r r e n t  
s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n s .  I f ,  however, we a sk  why r e l i g i o n  i s  more h igh ly  
related to party preference than sex, then a historical explanation must 
be invoked as a direct cause. We are able to answer this question on?. 19 
by turning to the histoffcal process that selected for a particular fun- 
ctional alternative. In short, there is no one correct approach; the 
research strategy is dictated by the questioas which are chosen. 
An Empirical Example: Permanent Employment in Japan 
In an effort to Illustrate the approaches suggested in this paper, 
I turn now to a consideration of the practice of permanent emplowent 
in Japan: Few social practices in Japan have so caught the attention of 
American Bocial scientists as has the practice of permanent employment. 
It is primarily through the work of James Abegglen (1958) in his widely 
discussed book, The Japanese Factory, that American social scientists 
have become aware of this practice (see also Odaka, 1963; Yoshino, 1967; 
Ballon 1969; Cole 1971; Marsh 1971). 
Permanent employment,inr the lifetime employment system as it is 
sometimes called, refers to the practice by which male employees, es- 
pecially those in large firms are hired upon graduation from school -- 
whether it be middle school, high school or college -- receive in-company 
training and remain employees in the same company until the retirement 
age of fifty-five. 
The permanent employment practice in Japan in no way restricts £he 
formal rights of employees to change employment. It has been established 
as a management policy to minimize the discharge of regular employees 
in large firms; it is reinforced by the explicit distribution of rewards 
according t o  age and l e n g t h  of  s e r v i c e  (nenko). The nenko wage system 
is ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  a  mechanism of de fe r r ed  wage payment w i th  younger workers 
be ing  underpaid r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e i r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  and o l d e r  workers be ing  
overpaid.  The economic r a t i o n a l i t y  of t h i s  reward s t r u c t u r e  i s  based 
on t h e  expec ta t ion  t h a t  employees w i l l  spend t h e i r  work c a r e e r s  i n  one 
f i rm.  A man's a c t u a l  performance i n  s t a y i n g  w i t h  a f i r m  dur ing  h i s  en- 
t i re  work c a r e e r  should n o t  be confused wmth h i s  s u b j e c t i v e  hopes and 
a s p i r a t i o n s .  Cole (1971: 131-35) p r e s e n t s  c a s e  s tudy  d a t a  showing 
t h a t  t h i s  a c t u a l  performance o f t e n  c o n f l i c t s  w i t h  i n d i v i d u a l  a s p i r a t i o n s  
f o r  job changing. Marsh (1971) r e p o r t s  case  s tudy  d a t a  showing t h e  
a c c e p t a b i l i t y  of t h e  norms and va lues  of job changing among employees. 
These d a t a  sugges t  t h a t  examination of t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  f a c t o r s  a f f e c t i n g  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  of employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s  r a t h e r  t han  a mys t i ca l  " t r a d i t i o n "  
i s  a  more u s e f u l  approach t o  decomposing t h e  meaning of permanent employ- 
men t . 
The s imp les t  measure of t h e  d i f f e r e n t  systems of employmmt s e c u r i t y  
and d i f f e r e n t  oppor tun i ty  s t r u c t u r e  f o r  i n t e r - f i r m  mob i l i t y  i n  t h e  
r'. [United S t a t e s  and Japan i s  t h e  r a t i o  of employed persons  changing j o b s . 2  
This  r a t i o  ms repor t ed  f o r  t h e  one-year pe r iod  from 1965-1966. Table 
3  p r e s e n t s  t h e  f ind ings .  The job change r a t i o  f o r  American females  of 
6.8 percent  i s  only s l i g h t l y  h ighe r  than  t h e  r a t i o  of 6.5 percent  f o r  
Japanese females.  Among males,  however, t h e  r a t i o  of 9.9 percent  f o r  
American males i s  more than  twice a s  h igh  a s  t h e  Japanese r a t i o  of 4.7 
pereent .  Looking a t  age - spec i f i c  job change r a t i o s ,  i t  may be  seen  t h a t  
t h e  g r e a t e s t  gap among males opens up i n  t h e  20-24 age  ca tegory  where 
t h e  r a t i o  hn t h e  United S t a t e s  i s  almost fou r  t i m e s  h ighe r  than  i n  Japan; 
t h e  s m a l l e s t  gap f o r  males occurs  from age 35-54 where t h e  American r a t i o  
i s  reduced t o  l e s s  t han  twice  a s  high a s  t h e  Japanese r a t i o .  These 
d i f f e r e n c e s  f o r  males i n  o v e r a l l  change r a t i o  and a g e l s p e c i f i c  change 
r a t i o s  should n o t  l e a d  us  t o  ignore  b a s i c  similarities i n  p a t t e r n  be- 
tween t h e  two s o c i e t i e s .  I n  both s o c i e t i e s ,  t h e  change r a t i o  i s  h ighes t  
f o r  males 18-19 wi th  t h e  r a t i o  undergoing gradual  d e c l i n e  t h e r e a f t e r .  
It should be noted  t h a t  t h e s e  d a t a  do no t  d i s t i n g u i s h  Between t h e  two 
>(divergent types  of j ab changes : voluntary  and invo lun ta ry .  C 
I n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  h igh  voluntary  q u i t f r a t e s  a r e  combined wi th  
h igh  invo lun ta ry  qmit r a t e s  based on managerial  pe roga t ives  t o  a d j u s t  
t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  t o  changing bus iness  cond i t i ons ;  an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  
l ayo f f  system t y p i f i e s  t h i s  approach. The American p r a c t i c e s  a r e  but-  
t r e s s e d  by a  wage system which e x p l i c i t l y  rewards product ive  performance. 
1 n . a  smauation where employees might change employment a t  any t ime,  i t  
is  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  system of de fe r r ed  wage payment i s  unacceptable .  
The e x i s t e n c e  of permanent employment i n  Japan confounds t h e  expec- 
t a t i o n s  of economists and s o c i o l o g i s t s  a l i k e  t h a t  h igh  r a t e s  of job 
mob i l i t y  a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  advanced l e v e l s  of  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  (Kerr,  
e t . a l . ,  1964: 17-18). Some s o c i ~ l o g i s t s  have even come t o  dewcribe t h e  
emergent " p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l  society ' '  p r e c i s e l y  in teerms of t h e  temporary 
k a t u r e  of i n d i v i d u a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  work o rgan iza t ions .  (Bennis a n d 5  
Slater, 1968). These expectations of high job mobility seem based on 
the view that individuals as resources to be efficiently and rationally 
used by prodmctive organizations must be separable from these organiza- 
tions under appropriate economic conditions. Such economic conditions 
are said to be present in advanced industrial societies characterized 
as they are by factors such as rapid technological innovation and the 
need continually to adjust and transfer factors of production. 
The stickinessoof Japanese interefirm mobility rates has led most 
observers to concentrate on the unique characterof intra-generational 
mobility patterns in Japan. The practice seems to.symbolize all the unique- 
ness that we have come to expect from Japan: enduring loyalty bo the 
corporate group, a system of shared obligations, and strong employee 
dependence upon powerful superiors. Scholars most associated.with this 
perspective are James Abegglen (1948) and Nakane Chie T1970). They rep- 
resent essentially the historicist analysis of thisgphenomenon. As such, 
these analyses are both incompatible with the goals of a generalizing 
social science and ignore some fundamental similarities with practices 
in other advanced industrial nations (to be discussed below). 
In addition, Abegglen's discussion of the permanent employment 
practice provides no dynamics either historically or in contemporary 
practice. Permanent employment is presented as arising out of Japanese 
tradition and as having adapted itself to modern needs. Much doubt has 
already been cast on Abegglen's historical treatmmt (Taira, 1962; Odaka, 
1963; Sumiya, 1966; Yoshino, 1967; Cole, 1971a). There was apparently 
considerably more variation in mobility rates historically than can be 
accounted for by simple reference to the enduring strenghh of Japahese 
A dtradition. It is possible, in fact, to trace the sets ofcconstraints ,sfif 
and available resources which ILed Japanese industrial leaders to select 
permanent employment as a solution to these needs and Japanese workers 
to accept these innovations (Cole, 1971a). In short, it is possible to 
depict the process of institutionalization whereby permanent employment 
gradually became established in selected firms and for eelected employees 
to the exclusion of alternative arrangements. 
An alternative position taken by some scholars (e.g., Bennett, 1967) 
is that of convergence. They see rapid transformations occurring in 
Jappaaeeepp~tee~aso~f11hbwrmmbBiifp~;imnppaicuar the shift from a 
labor supplus to a labor shortage econo* ia viewed as a critical factor 
driving up inter-firm mobility rates to a level characteristic of other 
advanced industrial societies. Existing rates of inter-firm mobility 
may also be seen as deriving from the nature mf industrial composition. 
We know that turnover rates, size distribution of firms and internal 
promotion ladders vary widelybby industry. As Japan shifts its industrial 
structure to patterns characteristic of other advanced industrial societies, 
it may be argued that the patterns of inter-fmrm mobility will move in(. 
the same direction. The enthusiasm of convergence advocates, however, is 
matched only by the lack of convincing data. I have discussed this prob- 
lem in depth wlsewhere (Cole, forthcoming). Here, it will suffice to 
note that despite massive shifts in industrial composition and marked 
changes in labor market relationships over the last 20 years, we can 
detect ohly modbst changes in inter-firm mobility rates. This suggests 
that permenent employment as crystallized in Japan has some significant 
and persistent strangths. 
The remaining discussion will not deal with the historical evolution 
of this pattern nor with contemporary pressures for change. Rather, the 
focus will be on present Japanese structural arrangements with their 
characteristic low rates of inter-firm mobility relative to the United 
States. The question posed is how may we best conceptualize the Japanese 
arrangements vis sv& the American arrangements. 
As advanced industrial societies, both Japan and the United States 
1  manif if est stratification systems involving a comple~&ivision of labor 
with individuals ranged according to a hierarchy of occupational skills. 
Both societies consequently must continually motivate individuals to 
train for, occupy and perform these occupational roles. The rapidity of 
technological innovation in both societies with the papid obsolescence 
of occupational skills means that these problep ,are not solved upon 
initial entry to the labor force. Insofar as both societies display an 
ability to operate complex technologies free from labor constraints, we 
may see the different structural arrangements regulating employment secur- 
ity and allowing differing opportunity for inter-firm mobilityqas func- 
tional alternatives. That is, using different arrangements for employment 
security andaallowing differing opportunity for inter-firm mobility, 
both societies succeed in motivating indivmduals to train for,ooccupy 
and perform the necessary (and increasingly common) occupational roles 
which keep their advanced technologies opeaative. 
The basic core of the permanent employment system is present in 
any ongoing industrial society. The reason lies in the fundamental nature 
of labor market arrangements. To be successful and persist, all produc- 
tive units try to reduce replacement and termination costs arising from 
employee turnover. The greater the investment of the firm in embodying 
specific training in individuals, the more fmportant it beommes to reduce 
movement out of the firm; otherwise, recruitment, seeeening, training and 
terrmPnation costs would prove unmanageable (Becker , 1964) . On the other 
side, workers develop psychological and economic stakes in their employ- 
ment; labor market arrangements must guarantee some degree of employment 
tenure if they are to successfully mobivate workers. Employees tend to 
prefer some system of internal replacement and upgrading since the oppor- 
tunity costs of enterprise mobility generally exceed zero. 
The kinds of elaborations that are built on this core structure de- 
pend on the political, social and cultural heritage of a given country 
and its specific industrial structure and labor market situation. The 
recent work of Piore and Doeringer (1971) provides help in coneeptual- 
w'izing these differences.@ They deal with the existence of interaal 
labor markets by administrative uhits such as manufacturing plants. 
Within these units, administrative rules and procedures govern the pricing 
and allocation of labor. This internal AAbor market is connected to the 
external labor market by certain job classifications which constitute 
ports of entry and exit to and from the interaal labor market. The re- 
mainder of the jobs are shielded from the direct influence of competitive 
forces in the external market and are filled by the promotion or trans- 
fer of workers who have already gained entry. 
Viewed from this framework, it seems that in Japan the ports of entry 
and exit and the traffic volume of these ports are more limited than in 
the United States. At issue is the rigidity of the rules which define 
the boundaries of internal markets and which govern allocation of the work 
force. The greater rigidity of the rules in Japan enables us to speak of 
more closed internal markets in the large industrial firms of Japan and 
more open internal markets in the United States. Piore and Doeringer 
(1971: 6) note that the rigidity of the internal market is associated 
with investment in enterprise specific human capital, on-the-job train- 
ing, and the role of labor as a fixed or quaki-fixed factor of production. 
These characteristics loom especially large in Japan (see Somers and 
Tsuda, 1966: 195-236, esp. 202). The greater role that seniority plays 
in the pricing and of labor in Japan also beoomes understand- 
)(able in this than emphasizing the uniqueness of nenkm 
and its basis in Japanese tradition, we may speak of the importance,of 
seniority in a situation in which workers have less$recourse to the 
Jmarket in highly structured internal markets. 
The strength of the Japanese approach in crystallizing a practice 
Ld 
,/of per*ent employment £65 selected employees is that is places a high 
premium on the resource of employee commitment and the benefits that flow 
8 JTO the organization from mobilizing this commitment. By combining a 
system of deferred rewards (nenko wage) with long-term service, loyalty 
to the firm and motivation to achieve formal organizational goals are 
,maximized. 
 his approach operates as a trad for the strengths associated 
with American practices. The advantages of the American practice of main- 
taining high rates of inter-firm mobility is that it provides for quick 
readjustment of 1abor.pools and skills in adjusting labor sosts to chang- 
ing business conditions. The layoff system, modified to meet some worker 
interests, institutionalizes management perogatives in this area. American 
practices of high inter-firm mobility further enable the organization to . 
cap tu re  t h o s e  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  flow t o  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  from being a b l e  t o  
mobi l ize  e x t e r n a l  sou rces  of t r a i n e d  l a b o r  a t  s h o r t  n o t i c e .  
The g r e a t e r  c o n s t r i c t i o n  of t h e  l a b o r  market i n  Japan,  w i t h  i t s  
part icular-- though n o t  exclusive--emphasis on recru i tment  a t  t ime of school  
,kfjraduation and r e t e n t i o n  of employees, reduces t h e  x i b i l i t y  of Japanese 
<employers. @ But i t  a l s o  permi ts  Japanese employers t o  avoid t h e  endemic 
P n s t a b i l i t i e s  apparent  i n  AmeFi a s  mani fes ted  i n  h igh  turnover  r a t e s ,  
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poor r e t u r n s  on t r a i n i n g  c o s t s ,  h igh  c o s t  of r ec ru i tmen t  and te rmina t ion  
)(and seemingly h igh  l e v e l s  of a l i e n a t i o n .  0 
The Japanese r e a l  economic growth r a t e  w a s  about t h r e e  t i m e s  a s  high 
a s  t h e  American r a t e d u r i n g  t h e  pe r iod  from 1955 to01972. This  has  meant 
an enormous c a p a c i t y  of Japanese s o c i e t y  t o  absorb  massive t echno log ica l  
innovat ion .  I n  a r e c e n t  fou r  year  per iod  (196691969), p r i v a t e  qquipmaat 
investment expanded a t  t h e  remarkable average r a t e  of 26 pe rcen t  a year  
(Economic Planning Agency, 1970: 15-16). Permanent employmmt p r a c t i c e s  
have Eerfnamaly been a major f a c t o r  i n  r e a l i z i n g  t h i s  capac i ty  through 
minimizing d i s l o c a t i o n s  and excess ive  c o s t s  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  and bus iness  
f i rms  & l i k e  which would l i k e l y  r e s u l t  from high  r a t e s  of job changing. 
Th&s succes s  is  dependent i n  t u r n  upon h igh ly  developed in-p lan t  t r a i n i n g  
and r e t r a i n i n g  programs t h a t  have cha rac t e r i zed  Japanese bus ines s  f i rms .  
I n  a r e c e n t  a r t i c l e ,  P e t e r  Drucker (1971: 118-22) has  suggested t h a t  
{Amqcan managers have much t o  l e a r n  from Japanese company p r a c t i c e s  of 
provid ing  "continuoas t r a i n i n g "  f o r  employees. The permanent employment 
%system avoids  much of t h e  "was& a s s o c i a t e d ' w i t h  employee and union re-  
s i s t a n c e  t o  eechnologica l  innovat ion d e r i v i n g  from t h r e a t s  t o  employment 
s e c u r i t y ,  such a s  has  cha rac t e r i zed  t h e  United S t a t e s .  When employees a r e  
relatively confident that they will retain their employment and be given 
the opportunity for job retraining, they can be expected to reduce their 
opposition to technological innovation. This is espeiially true where 
there exists a wage system such as Japan's which is not directly occupa- 
y tionally based. @ Similarly, employers can undertake extensive training 
of their employees, with less fear of losing their investment through 
inter-firm mobility. 
Figure 2 presents a schematic representation of the thesis presented 
tmnth&&sse~tion. The generalizdd model suggests that the ability of a firm 
to memove labor sonstraints on the utilization of technology depends on 
two major inputs: first, the mmbilization of high labor force commitment 
(e.g., minimizing quits, and alienation and maximizing loyalty to the firm), 
with a "capture" of the firm's investment in specific training; and secondly, 
the ability to adjust labor sosts to changing business conditions with a 
further capture of the benefits to be derived from mobilizing external 
/sources of taained labor. 
@ 
In practice, it is difficult to mobilize high labor force commitment 
and adjust labor costs to changing business conditions simultaneously. 
One principle reason ia that internal labor force commitment depends very 
Vmuch on assurance of employment security and adherence to the often strong@'& 
ly held value of employees that vacancies be filled from within the or- 
ganization. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to maximize these 
conditionsmhen management policies involve significant $se of fires, 
layoffs and hiring of trained external labor. Given these difficulties 
in reconciling the two inputs, the maximization of one generall$yresults 
in minimizing the other. 
The t h e s i s  proposed i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  &s t h a t ,  i n  Japan,  h i s t o r i c a l  
exper ience  has s e l e d t e d  f o r  maximizing i n t e r n a l  l a b o r  f o r c e  commitment 
and t h e  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  accrue  t o  t h e  o rgan iza t ion  from reducing  a l i e n a t i o n  
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sand qui t+  and f i r e s  among employees wh i l e  matkmizing t h e  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  
flow from i n v e s t i n g  i n  s p e c i f i c  t r a i n i n g .  This  ope ra t e s  a s  a  t rade-off  
f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  t h e  o rgan iza t ion  would have e q e r i e n c e d d f  rom having 
more f l e x i b i l i t y  i n . a d j u s t i n g  l abo r  c o s t s  t o  changing bus ines s  cond i t i ons  
and hav ind . acces s  t o  e x t e r n a l  sources  of t r a i n e d  l abo r .  I n  t h e  United 
S t a t e s ,  t h e h h i s t o r i c a l  p roces s  of , s e l e c t i o n  has  been such t h a t  t h e  oppo- 
s i t e  t rade-off  is made. I n  t h e  sense  t h a t  t h e  choiees  made i n  bo th  n a t i o n s  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  remove l a b o r  c o n s t r a i n t s  on t h e  u t i l i z a t i o n  of technology 
they  ope ra t e  a s  f u n c t i o n a l  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  one another .  
One may ad$, of course ,  t h e  ques t ion  of which t rade-of f  more e f f i e  
c i e n t l y  removes l a b o r  c o n s t r a i n t s  on t h e  u t i l i z a t i o n  of technology,  o r  
t h e  more gene ra l  ques t ion  of whether t h e r e  are opt imal  t r a d e - o f f s w h i c h  
perhaps n e i t h e r  country has  achieved. It seems l k k e l y ,  f o r  example, t h a t  
a s  Japanese economic growth slows down, c u r r e n t  t r ade -o f f s  between t h e  
two i n p u t s  may become more of a  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  employers w i t h  t h e i r  
having g r e a t e r  need f o r  i nc reased  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  a d j u s t i n g  l a b o r  c o s t s .  
These a r e  both ques t ions  deserv ing  f u r t h e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  
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Conclusion 
Intthis paper, I have tried to suggest the importance of functional 
alternatives as an analygical construct. Its importance lies in its 
ability to serve as an alternative to sociological explanations which 
emphasizesthe polar positions of'cultural and structural uniqueness or 
cultural and structural universals. The task is to establish how dif- 
ferent structural arrangements or value systems may have the same con- 
sequences for the larger systems in which they are implicated. While 
perfect equivalence is not to be expected, the heuristic value of hypoth- 
esized functional alternatives is great. 
To undersaand why one rather than another functional alternative 
becomes established requires historical analysis. At present, m y  
sociologists are still trying to establish the degree ofccommonality 
in structural outcomes at given levels of industrialization. It will be 
necessary to go beyond this to.examine these structural arrangements, 
whether similar or different, and ascertain their basis for coming into 
existence, and the basis for their maintenance. 
FOOTNOEES 
1. Def in inghhis tory  i n  a narrow sense  one may argue  t h a t  a non-experimental 
o b s e r v a t i o n a l  b a s i s  f o r  a s c i ence  i s  always h i s t o r i c a l  i n s o f a r  a s  causa l  
exp lana t ion  invo lves  a s c e r t a i n i n g  t h e  temporal  p r i o r i t y  of c a u s a l  f a c t o r s  
(Kar l  Popper, 1957: 38-39). 
2; W e  should be cau t ious  about s ee ing  t h e  United S t a t e s  a s  t h e  model of 
t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  n a t i o n  which must be emulated i f  modernity i s t b o  be  achieved. 
I f  w e  compare l a b o r  turnover  t a t e s  ( a  more i n d i r e c t  measure of job mobi l i ty )  
i n  manufactur ing of Japan wi th  England and West Germny, it appears  t h e  
Japanese rate i s  only s l i g h t l y  lower (OECD, 1965: 50) .  Perhaps s t u d e n t s  
of Japanese cond i t i ons  ought t o  be comparing t h e i r  f i nd ings  t o  t h e  unique 
l a b o r  market t r a d i t i o n  of t h e  United S t a t e s .  
3. See a l s o  Dunlop (1966). 
6. Commitment, whi le  undoubtedly never  complete,  involves  bo th  t h e  per- 
formance of a p p r o p r i a t e  a c t i o n s  i n  a given s o c i a l  contex t  and t h e  acceptance 
of t h e  n a m a t i v e  system t h a t  s e t s  ou t  t h e  r u l e s  and t h e i r  r a t i o n a l e  ( c f .  
- 
Moore, 1965: 40).  
. . 
4 .  The more important  r o l e  played by s e n i o r i t y  i n - J a p a n e s e  i n d u s t r y  a s  
compared t o  t h e  U.S. has  been poin ted  ou t  by numerous observers .  See 
W h i t e h i l l  and Takezawa (1968: 127-156). 
5. George Taylor  (1966) 132) makes t h e  same argument i n  exp la in ing  why 
s e n i o r i t y  p r i n c i p l e s  develop i n  some American i n d u s t r i e s  and not  o t h e r s .  
7. It a l s o  means t h a t  employers are l i k e l y  t o  a d j u s t  p r i c e s  downward 
*ra ther  than  output  when confronted w i t h  shor@un problems. This  theme 
should no t  be overdone, however, s i n c e  t h e r e  a r e  a l s o  a v a r i e t y  of informal  
means f o r  management t o  a d j u s t  l a b o r  c o s t s  t o  changing bus ines s  cond i t i ons  
(Cole,  1971) . 
8. . For anaana lys i s  on t h e  American scene ,  see Stanley  Lebergot t  (1968: 122-27). 
9. This  t h e s i s  i s  e a s i l y  exaggerated,  however. Pub l i c  opinion p o l l s  
f o r  example, show a less than  f avorab le  a t t i t u d e  by t h e  Japanese p u b l i c  
toward t h e  impact of technology ( I sh idq ,  1971: 98).  Cole (1971: 
92-100) r e p o r t s  ca se  s.tudy d a t a  documenting employee r e s t f f c t i o n  of pro- 
duc t ion .  Viewed from t h e  American s i d e ,  i t  has  been noted  i n  American 
i n d u s t r y  a s  w e l l  t h a t  employment guarantees  are a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  cons iderable  
managerial  freedom t o  modify jobs and t o  redeploy t h e  i n t e r n a l  l a b o r  f o r c e  
( P i o r e  and Doeringer,  1971: 57).  
10.  The l e v e l  of t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  commitment important  t o  t h e  f i r m  can be 
expected t o  vary  wi th  t h e  nh tu re  of t h e  technology i n , q u e s t i o n .  
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less biting but of great value. I take full responsibility 
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This paper is concerned with the.concept of functional 
alternatives. In general fashion, this concept has been used 
to suggest that there is a range of structural or value 
arrangements that may serve to fulfill a common function. 
Despite what appears to be a growing disenchantment with the 
wares of structura'l-functional analysis by contemporary 
sociologists, even those spokesmen for a more empirically 
oriented sociology continue to find the concept of functional 
alternatives useful (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1968:80-125; Coleman, 
1969:291-292). Discussion in this paper focuses on conveying 
the importance of the concept of functional alternatives, 
making it trim for empirically minded sociologists, and sug- 
gesting guidelines designed to-avoid common pitfalls and 
increase the probability of developing empirically testable 
propositi~as~ The final section of the paper will be devoted 
to an empirical case examining the system of employment 
security dominant in large-scale Japanese industrial firms. 
Those engaged in empirical comparative research on the. 
relationsnip. between .technologica~~~complexity.and economic 
organization on the.one hand and social structure on the 
other face the continual need to choose between two ways 
' . of casting their interpretation of .data and presenting 
their findings. . This. is .the choice .between "culturalist'' 
or "historicist" -explanations.on-the one .hand- and the.need 
to recognize the commonalities thatrall.human societies 
share and the commonalities that. soc,ieties share by virtue 
of having achieved a given level of technological complexity 
and economic organization-. The. issuec.is- .specifically 
. .. ' .. . 
joined in the discussion generated. byv ".convergence theory" 
where it is hypothesized that growing -similarities in 
social structure come to characterize advanced industrial 
societies as unique historical differences come to play 
a more restricted role. Critics of convergence theory 
have attacked the assumption of strict- functional inter- 
dependence among component parts and have advanced a 
thesis stressing the partial nature of solutions to problems 
of social organization in the course of economic development. 1 
Reinhard Bendix speaks of the way comparative analysis 
forces us to see social structure not "as a natural system 
with defined limits and invariant 1aws.governing an equili- 
brating process, but rather as a system- of- historical 
dimensions" (1963:537). These historical dimensions 
influence point of origin, route and-temporary destinations 
of social structures under the impact of and interacting 
with economic development. To say.that social structure is 
a system.,of historical dimensions'means that historical 
context-influences the operation of seemingly invariant 
processes such as industrialization and thus makes. possible 
a meaningful conception of process .(e..f.. Nisbet, 1969; 
Gerschenkron, 1964). The extent to.'which.we can conceptualize 
historical processes in an intelligent fashion is based on our 
ability to separate .random from nonrandom processes. As 
Boulding (1970:16) .notes, the human-mind has a profound 
tendency. towards super.stition, . that is, - "the .imposition of 
a spurious order - on- its observation---of - .r.andom processes. " 
To say that .social structurec-is.a system of.historica1 
dimensions does.not mean, however;-that we accept.the 
extreme version of historicism. Historicism is a point 
of view that asserts historical-uniqueness and denies 
attempts to formulate generalizable--propositions applicable 
to more.than one society, culture, or period. The focus 
is rather on the ordering of temporal events which crystallize 
to form unique organizational and societal patterns, One 
understands the meanings of these historical experiences only 
by concentrating on relevant historical events. Robert 
Nisbet (1969) in his recent provocative book Social Change 
and History comes close to taking this position. 
Comparative sociologists reject-the historicist view; 
they- seek generalizable. statements- which apply to more than 
one, society (Shils, 1963:l-26; Bendix, 1963:532-539). It,is 
expected that the historical experience of one society will 
illuminate the meanings- of historical experiences in other 
societies, Ideally, these general propositions are-not 
rooted in any-one society; they transcend specific societies. 
Yet, they-prove their utility by helping to explain specific 
empirical processes, One such analytic concept is- that ,of 
occupational prestige. It refers .to-.a,-hierarchy of evalua- 
tions. In itself, it says nothing.about a specific society 
but in the course .of .asking how societies evaluate their 
occupations, .we.come..to .recognize ce~tain.cornmonalities and 
differences. The problem then.becomes.one, of.searching for 
conditions that are likely to produce one rather than another 
of these outcomes. The task of the social scientist becomes 
one of cataloging and suggesting causal .relations between the 
limited range of possible outcomes and other associated 
variables. (See Hodge, Treiman and .Rossi, 1966) 
I To summarize, the bridge between historical observations 
and general theory lies in developing theories comprised of 
a set of statements that- are general, parsimonious and con-. 
tain a causal set of statements. At.the same time, this 
2 
set of statements proves its utility by explaining specific 
empirical processesd It is in this context-that ,Przeworski 
. . and Teune (1970:17-30) argue-that the role of comparative 
research in the process of tneory-building and testing is 
the replacing.of-the proper names- of -social systems (e.g., 
China, France, Sweden) by specific variables. They treat 
names of nations and social systems as residua of variables 
that influence the phenomenon being.explained but have not yet 
been considered. 
Functional Alternatives 
It is with an eye to bridging this gap between theory 
and concrete sociological observations.that the concept of 
functional alternatives becomes useful. As Shils (1963) 
has noted what is needed are.sociological concepts which 
both allow for societal uniqueness and explain it in a 
wider analytical framework. While it is not hard to agree 
with Przeworski and Teune that the goal of comparative 
research is to replace the proper names: of social systems 
by specific variables, it does seem advisable-not to 
decide a. priori. .that .specific. historical .sequences of - - 
events. be-treated .as residua.. The concept of functional 
alternatives is useful precisely because it does not 
prejudice the -outcome of empirical- research- at the outset. 
It is the absence of such analytical formulations that often. 
leads sociologists .to adopt either the extreme position of- 
cultural uniqueness or to endorse notions., of universal con- 
. . 
conimitgnts of industrialization, 
One example- is the way- research- on. comparative 
occupational prestige rankings has proceeded. The earlier 
focus of 1nkkles' and Rossi (1956) purported to show the 
. . 
weakness of the- ".culturalist'! position and the strength 
- . .  . . \  
of the.'~structu~alis.t"..position emphasizing the relatively 
invariable hierarchy of .prestige associated with the 
industrial system: Later research (Hodge,.Treiman and 
Rossi, 1966 : 309-321) points to similarity in occupational ,. 
prestige- rankings even in non-industrial societies. This 
is accounted for by an assertion.of. "the essential structural 
similarity shared by all nations of any..degree.of complexity'.' 
(Hodge, Treiman and Rossi, 1966 : 321) . .. What. .research. in. this. 
area has not done,is to examine the signifi.cance.of occupa- 
tional prestige rankings for individuals in these respective. 
societies. Does.the occupational prestige hierarchy have 
motivational consequences for individuals? There is suf- 
ficient evidence- to .suggest that occupational achievement is 
not a major focus for large sectors of the American labor 
2 force. Concern with job security;with community and family 
status, may be more evident. One may-then'ask now are 
individuals motivated to'-train .and..ffl2 occupational roles 
in different societies. Functional.-alter.natives in this 
case refer to the empirical possibility that different 
structural arrangements (e.g,, -systems of employment 
security, reward systems, educational systems) and/or 
value systems may emerge in different.societies to insure 
recruitment to these occupational roles and their perfor- 
mance, An example of such an equivalent will be discussed 
in the final section of this paper, 
We may summarize the different approaches discussed 
thus far as a typology using a two by two table which 
compares two sets of structural arrangements'and their 
consequences. 
Table 1. --Comparison of two or -more..-str.uctur.es and their 
consequences 
- -  
Different 
: . . 





Historicism.. .. - .;-:.: -: -..:r. ... :.. .. St~,uctural Modelling . .. 
'(cultural --reLativism) . .. -.- . with 
EnvironmentaL- Ef f ects 
. -  . . .. . . 
' Functional , . ..Convergence 
.Alternatives . :. . . :  . .- . Theory 
i ' t  
Three of the four cells have- been .discussed. ~istoricism is 
an argument for uniqueness in both structure and structural 
consequences; convergence theory focuses-on the-growing 
similarity of structural-.arrangements.-whsch.have common 
consequences. The third cell of functional alternatives 
which hypothesizes different structural arrangements with 
similar consequences is the central concern of this paper, 
I suggest that it is simplistic to.focus exclusively on 
the "all or nothing" propositions -which flow from the 
historicist and convergence,cells, 
The fourth cell , which I -havetlabelled *structural - .- 
modelling with environmental -eTfects; has -yet to be dis- 
cussed, The possibility of their developing similar 
structural arrangements but with-different outcomes has 
not been formulated by sociologists -as a-major societal 
response to economic development. Nevertheless, social 
scientists have often pointed out how "modern" appearing 
structural arrangements in non-western-societies, often 
borrowed. from the west, have unanticipated consequences 
that are. quite different ..from. those,-in -western societies. 
t '.: 
The 'basis for these unanticipated-consequences lies in 
these structural arrangements having to cope with and draw 
resources from a quite different social and even physical 
environment. For example, the Japanese university system, 
though modelled after the German system in the pre-World War 
I1 period and the American system-in the post-war period, 
has had a number of distinctive consequences which have not 
been shared by its counterparts in Germany and later 
America. The basis for these different consequences lies 
in the quite different social context-in which this institution 
appeared (see Pass2n, 1965) . 
In the past, sociologists~have used such concepts as 
functional' equivalents, functional alternatives, functional 
substitutes, and functional analogues..in rather loose and 
interchangeable- fashion, - Our discussion -is intended to 
apply to all these concepts. The.terms -themselves invoke 
the language of structural-functional analysis; they have 
been based on the premise that we-can identify specific 
functiona'l - prerequis.ites or "universal;. needsw which must 
be performed to permit .societies .to.'persist (-Aberle et ale, 
1950; Levy, 1966 : 175-187)., An ..even-,.more demanding version 
(more demanding in the .sense - of -..requirjng .more detailed 
specification) is that we can fdentify,.at-:varying levels 
of development certain functional prerequisities which must 
be satisfied if a society is to successfully proceed with 
modernization. When these -functional -.requirements are. 
not met, further economic. development'-or..modernization 
will not occur, This has been an implicit assumption in 
much of the modernization literature,based on the search- 
for universal preconditions ~o~unkversal~~obstacles to develop- 
ment. . Gerschenkron (19.65: 31-511.-and...Hir.schman. (1965: 385-393) 
provide biting critiques .of these"assumptfons. Gerschenkron 
shows that many.alleged .precondft$ons..-are .concomitants of 
economic growth while Hirschman--demonstrates that many 
alleged.obstacles have on occasion been beneficial for 
economic growth. 
For some.of the early f u n c t i o n a l i s t s ' - . s u c h . a s  Malinowski 
(1926:136) the assumption .of functfonak~.indispensability was 
ambiguous. It .was not. .clear whether:-.it.-was the .function 
that was indispensable.or the 'structural .item fulfilling 
this function. . This vagueness',has'--by':.no means -disappeared 
as , Gerschenkron. and .Hir.schman show.-:--'-Neuer.theless, leading 
I . . 
spokesmen for structural-functional-'theory..have recognized 
the problem. The'distinction that is-now commonly made is 
that we may speak of functional needs but that these needs 
may be met by a range .of. .structuraZ---a2ter.natives (Mertpn, 
1957:32-37). 
Notwithstanding ~.these.modffications, critics continue 
to point to the deficiencies of functional-analysis. There 
is no needto rehash..these criticisms here. (See.Hempe1, 
I 
1959:271-307 f0r.a more intensive .treatment.) 
Those; criticisms relevant - to 'our -,discussion are. that 
key terms.of functional.analysis~such~as~ need and functional 
prerequisite have been .used in.a'nonempirical manner without 
providing clear operational.definktions.~. Without a specifi- 
cation .,of .- how these terms can be ,-applied -to the. empirical 
world they - lead to. no ..specific.:predict.ions .and .cannot. be put 
to empirical use. Par.ticularly~'.important .in .terms of. its 
weak explanatory force is .that2-functkonal~.analysis does not- 
provide an explanation of ,why a-particular item rather than 
some functional alternative of '.it..occurs in a given- system. 
This is a consideration we will deal'with-.later under the 
section,. historical explap,ation and functional.alternatives. 
These weaknesses have become increasingly clear to 
contemporary empirically minded--sociologists. What is 
needed is a way to capitalize on the strengths of the 
concept of functional alternatives citied earlier and 
separate it from the limitations just noted. Rather than 
speak of functional prerequisities, I suggest we focus 
on common problems that have to be solved at certain levels 
of industrialization. This approach -allows for universal 
problems such as establishment of factory discipline and 
recruitment of a labor force as well as problems faced by a 
selected number of societies. An example of the latter would 
be those problems which confront-latecomers seeking to 
industrialize in a world already dominated by highly 
industrialized nations, Even universal problems such as 
recruitment of a labor force are strongly influenced by the 
historical timing of the industrialization (e.g., quality of 
labor force changes). 
Functional alternatives refer to -the empirical pos- 
sibility that sociaL units evolve different structural 
arrangements to solve common problems; It permits us to 
accept societal differences without,having to fall back on 
explanations based on historica~~uniqueness. Instead we may 
incorporate these societal differences in a common analytic 
i 
framework. 
An attempt to grope -toward-.a. more quantitative expres- 
sion of functional .alternatives ..appears ..in recent sociologi- 
cal literature. Janowitz and Segal (1967:601-618) examine 
determinants of party affiliation-in .Germany, Great Britian, 
and the United States. Their specific intention is to 
"analyze variables that had comparabPe meaning and signifi- 
cance in each country" (Janowitz and.Sega1, 1967:604). 
Using a series of paired comparisons, the authors find 
that party affiliations were most'-polarized on the basis 
of socioeconomic positions in Great Britain, less in 
Germany, and the least in the United States. High 
polarization occurs when the working-class supports the 
main party of the left while the middle and upper income 
groups support the major non-left-party. . Low polarization 
occurs when there is little association between socioeconomic 
status and political affiliation. 
The - primary focus. of -.the authors is --.to show that. in- . 
each country there are secondary bases of political cleavage. 
I shall limit my discussion of their procedures and findings 
to the United States and- Germany for illustrative purposes. 
In the- U. S .  they. find..that .the -key. secondary variable 
influencing political affiliation is race, while in Germany 
they find that the key secondary variable influencing politi- 
cal affiliation is-religion. The logic of the authors' state- 
ment cited above is that religion-in -Germany and race.in the 
United States are equivalents though in'fact the authors 
studiously avoid making a direct statement to this effect. 
If all we intend by caLling religion'inp-Germany and race in 
the United States functional-alternatives is to call attention 
to the fact that they both serve-as secondary bases of social 
cleavage inf luencing the .distribution -of.--.party af f iliation, 
then there cdn be no obj.ection.-to.-the -use.-.of this. term. 
But formulating it in.thi.s fashion-is,.after all, not a 
very.powerfu1 statement. We want.-to:know..whether these 
secondary bases.of social .cleavage-actually .operated to 
produce the same outcome. In. askjlng...this question of - the 
Janowitz and Segal data, the functional .alternative inter- 
pretation becomes. no 1onger.tenable. 
TABLE 2. --Socioeconom~c .status, ..social -.cleavage, . and 
party- affiliation: United states:-.and Germany* - 
Total Sample *Partial ReLations within 
- Social Groups 
United States V=. 16-2. White V=. 149 
Non-white V=. 011 
Germany. V=.284 Catholic V=.297 
.,Nan-catholic V=.251 
*Adapted from Morris .Janowftz .and.Davsd.-.Segal (1967: 610) . 
Table. 2 presents the --.degree -.of -association of party 
affiliation with socioeconomic-positkon for each nation 
holding.constant r,ace for the United States and religion 
constant for Germany.. The measure-of-.association is 
Cramer.' s V. For the .total sample; .,we see .first. that socio- 
economic status produces .a stronger;-.polarization in Germany 
(V=. 284) than in the .United States , (V=.-.162):.. . Perfect associa- 
tion between socioeconomic status -and--party.-affiliation would 
be represented by V=l, Secondly, .when-we.-look at social 
cleavage, we find that race in the United--States and religion 
in Germany are not operating in.-a.-uniform .direction in terms 
of their influence on party affiliation. 
As the authors note, "the consequences of,these cleavages 
for political change depend on:whether.they work to reduce or 
to heighten the strains genera ted-by~oc ioeconomic  stratifica-. 
tion." Unfortunately; theydo not..systematically follow up 
this observation. One gets a sense- of the different direction 
in which these variablesare 0perating:by .expressing the 
extremes of the range: for blacks-in.the United States, the 
degree of association of party-affiliation with socioeconomic 
position (V=.. 011) is weakened .as campared.:to the whole 
sample. (V=.149). That is,-the,.predominantly Democratic 
Party affiliation of blacks means-that-their party affilia- 
tion-is relatively unrelated to sockoeconomic position. 
For Catholics in Germany, however; the degree of association 
of party affiliation with socioeconomic position (V=.297) is 
strengthened as compared to the-whole sample (V=.284). In 
summary, given these differences in direction of relationship, 
it is not appropriate to speak of race-in the United States 
and religion in Germany as being. functional alternatives 
with respect to impact on party affiliation. If the authors 
had pushed the comparison of race in-the United States and 
religion in Germany far .enough-in their attempt to uncover 
variables that had "comparable meaning -and significance in 
each c~untry,~ they would have discovered substantial 
differences. But they did make-a case for establishing the 
secondary bases of social cleavage influencing,party polariza- 
tion after the primary -impact of~socioeconom~c status. 3 
With this. empirical example in mind, I-'turn now to identifying 
some common pitfalls in research utilizing the concept of 
functional alternatives. and to proposing some strategies to 
avoid these pitfalls, 
Some Suggested Guidelines for Establishing-. , 
Functional Alternatives' - - -  - 
1- The first task for theZresearcher is-to identify clearly 
the model being considered and-the-hypothesized consequences 
,of specific variables for other-referents in the social 
structure. It is the identification of the consequences 
of a specific structural pattern-for-a specific referent 
in a circumscribed system that ought to shape the identifi- 
cation ,of. functional. .alternatives..- .Much research based on 
the concept of - functional- alternatkves has\.-suf f ered from. 
( .  
the- failure to specify.clearly.the.referents in the original 
!:, 5 
!I 
$ode1 (c. f. Hempel, 1959:292) .  his-.failuredoes not allow. 
C!. 8. meaningful empirical. test .of .-: the proposed proposition. 
;i ' 
A prime example-is recent research-kn'the non-Western world 
devoted to establishing .a functkonaP..analogue to the 
Protestant Ethic. . Some .scholars have"focused on.the motiva- 
tion religion is supposed to-..have~..provided . . an .emergent 
entrepreneurial class ,. others .on the'.roZe:of the. Protestant 
Ethic. as a force for the :structural-' transformation of western 
societies. Obviously. the selection'-of "one -or the. other 
referent will critically determ-ine-the-nature of..the search 
for an equivalent and the 1ikelihood.of-:£.inding one. ? 
The referent that Weber had in-:mind,.in:.discussing. the impact 
of the Protestant Ethic was an emergent-Capitalism. What 
does it mean to change the referent'to'.industrialism or 
socialism? Few scholars trying to apply the Weberian 
formulation have faced the impl-ications -.of. this change- in 
\ 
referent (see Eisenstadt, 1968).. . In "short, the use. .of 
functional- alternatives -.as. an. effecthe. .analytical tool 
is predicated on -the..car.eful'~specifkcation f-the original 
model (original only in the sense that the researcher has 
so designated it) which includes a delineation of the con- 
sequences of the given structural'pattern for a given referent. 
2. At the same timei the -search:for functional alternatives- 
must be tempered by a recognition that no structural pattern.. 
in one society.will.have-consequences that are completely 
equivalent to another pattern in's.-different society. This 
is because a structural .patternLpresupposes a variety of 
underpinnings. and interrelations .-with :.other- structures 
and has a variety of consequences-.that-,are not likely to 
be - duplicated with .a .point .by point.':cor.r.espondence in 
isomorphic fashion. .Indeed; '.the. Janowitz:.and .Segal 
research as well as -the .f.i.nal example presented in this 
paper suggest that .as one moves from-compar.isons at a 
general level to a car.efu1 detailing'".of- the variety of 
consequences manifested by a structural pattern, the less 
likely is it that an -equ~valent:'wilk~-,be found. This 
should not be- in.terpr.eted as failure:-:-":.En:.the first place, 
although a structural pattern has:-a:-.varie.ty of. consequences 
for different referents, it is-quite-proper--indeed-it. is
necessary--that a carefully formulated hypothesis specifically 
delimit those consequences of the-:pattern--and the referents 
with.which the.research is concerned.. Thus, while-no 
structural pattern is likely to duplkcate an.other in all 
respects with regard' to consequences--for .one, or more 
referents, analytically, it may. be:-appropriate to discuss 
the limited equivalence of specific.consequences of 
structural patterns. In.-short:;'exact correspondence in 
all consequences should not be confused .wfth.the utility 
of an analytical framework concerned'~with a limited set 
of consequences. A -good ,-example.'of .the ..form that. circum- 
scribed statements: about equivalence. may take, appears in 
the following assertion- by. Coleman (1969:292) : 
Many- activities .may be alternatfvely'.carried out,. 
by the community .or the family, with.either .sub- 
stituting- for the- other: disciplkning-children, 
controlling.crime and enforcing"socia1 norms, 
sheltering or aiding -handicapped..or otherwise 
dependent  member.^, and the vari-ety..of other 
functions that communities and:.famflies perform, 
The family and community.differ in size and in 
strength and permanence..of-.attachment, but their 
potential functions are similar.;:-except for the 
child-socializing function .in'whfch'the community. 
seldom. substitutes for the family. 
A second reason that lack of complete equivalence 
. . 
should not be interpreted as.failure .is .that the concept 
of functional alternatives not only provides an explanatory 
category but also operates asa.heuristfc -construct. To 
the extent that we formulate research -designs predicated 
on establishing functional alternat'ives and come to under- 
spand that the two or more patterns.-under -investigation 
. . 
operate quite differently, this may contribute to our know- 
& - 
I 
lpdge of the Phenomena under investigation. It leads us to 
t 
\ 
3; A third set of guidelines may be derived £rom our dis- 
cvssion of the Janowitz and Segal contribution. When 
for identification of a functional alternative 
; i 
takes. F I 
.: f . 
a statistical form, the research should make certain 
: :  
that the direction of association be,-similar so as to . . 
'.. 
jkstify using the concept of -functional alternatives. 
I 
2 i 
$pen more imbortant than' this, however,, is that equivalence 
! 
'in coefficients .cannot be equated with equivalence in content. 
Just as correlation is not a substitute for causal analysis, 
per cent of variance. explained' is-..no.' substitute for carefully 
w+king out the logical interrelatedness of the phenomena 
under investigation. 
4. The. dictum. that propositions: should be. stated in. as. 
general and yet parsimonious-.fashion'as possible has not 
always.been adhered to .in research-using the concept of 
functional alternatives.. This can; lead -.to rather misguided 
. * 
research designs. Again, the research ,.devoted establishing 
functional equivalents to the.Protestant .Ethic in the non- 
Western world serves as -a good'.example -of -.what ought not 
to be done, The search for an analogue to- th'e- rotest st ant.:^ 
Ethic has been needlessly restricted -to -religious structures 
and values, Neil Smelser (1963) -makes exactly this point in 
an overall critique on the disproportfonate amount of atten- 
tion that has been devoted to the initiatkng role that formal 
religious values play in economic development (see also McClelland, 
1961). He suggests that the role of secular nationalism may 
perform the same functions for many of the non-Western nations 
that the Protestant Ethic is alleged to have performed in the 
West. Smelser suggests that the great strength of existing 
traditional commitments and modes-of integration in pre- 
industrial societies requires a very generalized and powerful 
commitment to pry individuals from these -attachments (Smelser, 
1963:38-39). The values of this worldly, ascetic religious 
belief may be one source for this.commitment but so may be the 
secular ideologies of nationalism and socialism. The thrust 
of.,this discussion is that framPng theissue in terms 0f.a 
search for an~lqguesto the Protestant--Ethic needlessly restricts 
the choices. Instead a more parsimonious and yet inclusive 
statement is to ask how industrializing nations develop a 
commitment from its members to action consistent with the 
exigencies of modern economic growth;- What functional 
alternatives exist? How does the availability of functional 
alternatives get conditioned by the-historical timing of the 
industrialization process? 
5. A fifth consideration is suggested:-by-the Smelser. 
critique. To argue-that,:a .functionaz-alternative xists. 
requires statements- of relative-causal. importance:. Too 
often sociologists -have been .gui kty.'of :-stating that, a 
particular structural arrangement.or.-value. system has 
important consequences for a given-.system-.without establish- 
ing its degree of importance relative-to other,existing- 
causal.factors. Robert Bellah's work:on Tokugawa Japan 
(1957) illustrates ..the.. problem. .-He ;provides a convincing 
statement that, religious factors..were 'a necessary if.. not. 
sufficient explanatkon,for ~Japan~Ls~~~successful attempt to 
industrialize. Yet, ,while there .is..a-.general discussion 
of the importance.,of the polkty.; -we. do:.not get an-, evalua- . . 
tion of the relative -.importance:-0-5.-nationalisrn as a motivat- 
ing factor reiative..to .religious vazues.:. What were their. 
i 
relative- weights -in- contribution..tof.the..-.economic. otivation 
of, the Japanese? To .what extent -did'.they. fuse and inter- 
penetrate.one another? If we are -to.speak of functional 
alternatives in a meaningful. sense; -it.is,:not enough to 
establish that. given s t r u c t u r a l ~ ~ ~ a r r a n g e m e n t s  or value 
systems are.important 2n two different societies-in pro-- 
ducing- a specified .consequence.. . .Rather- we- must seek. to. 
demonstrate that the. two factors:.had~:.similar weights in 
contributing to the referent under--consideration. Were 
religious. values more important.'.in.-EngPand in providing 
economic motivation with'-nationalfsm-.taking second place, 
, . . .  
while in Japan was nationalism-.of.-pr.kmar.y.-importance with 
religious values having secondary-.importance? There is some 
'. 
evidence to suggest- that .this .mi ght-be--the -case. (For 
suggestive rather --than concl~sive .evi.dence, see Pyle, 
1969; Thompson, 1963.) 
To meet these.kinds:-.of:~recjdirementsyfor establishment 
of functional alternati,ves -;is:-ckeaakyno -small task. In 
the past, the .weaknesses ..of .-socio1ogists~~'kn~ this respect, 
especially i n  the -area of historical:-sockology~, has been 
attributable, in part, to the.l-ack:-of reliable and 
quantif f able data. But .clearly if sociology is to go beyond 
I 
merely suggestive and plauskble~exp~anations, such assignment 
of causal importance of alternative factors.is a critical 
. . goal. . It. is the gradual. -.exclusSon:.of "alternative-;hypotheses 
and establishment of'causal importance--among a variety of 
"competing causes" that lies at the.heart-of empirical 
social science. 
6. A sixth.,guideline: for carrying outi analysis - using the- 
concept of functkonal alternatives~.lies;'in clearly.estab- 
lishing the historical evolution:-of:-the social arrangements 
in question .to understand. why and .how .societal. experience. 
selects for - one rather. .than :another:-.alter.native; This, 
will. be - the .basis for. di.scussion:kn.~~;.the~~-next .. s c ion. . 
As noted earlier, ..a:-ma.$or.-.weakness :of ' f unctionall analysis 
is its lack .of:. explanation ~.f:~.why~ti:.'pa'rticular item :rather 
than some .functional.alternative. ' . occurs in a given- 
system. 1n.considering the. persistence. of -a given.structura1 
pittern, it cannot .be assumed.. that--.once-,key d cksions leading 
to its. institutfona1:i.zation.-"at:..an--earlier -time have been made, 
a society is :. .locked....irnto,.:maint.a5nf ng - that pattern. 
The essential-..-distinction-..that?.mus-t;:.be-made concerns the. 
way patterns specific .to a .given;,:society-'arise, and how 
they may .or may- not..come :to-;be--preserved<.- To establish- 
causal. linkages. necessL.tates.-.askf ng.-three-questions.: 
first, what are..the-..particul-ar:-set-.of:.factors responsible. , 
for the- emergence of the .pattern-;.i-what:..are,.the set of 
factors by which social arrangements.-reproduce themselves; 
and thirdly, . to. what. extent-,- do~:those~:resources responsible- 
) 
for reproduct<od remain-~~ntinua~ly~available : to a d  just to 
changing internal .... tens.-ions :and.<.-ehangkng+environmenta$ 
conditions (co:f., Stinchcome.; -&968.:,.101-102) . 
In. cases :;where .a .given.--soaiaLr.:arrangement . is"preserved, 
the goal is to .distinguish ,betweenz:.what caused the particular 
pattern at -an. early. time-.~period.;..::.how~~~:it~ came : to. be established 
through a. process of. .posit.i-ve . feedbackl- or'.deviation. amplifying 
feedback, - and the:.natur.e ..of -the.::seXf=:repTkcating- causal loop. 
that preserves the: pattern. .at:.a.:- still -.&ater- time period. The . 
issue raised .here .is..one.-..of;.histo~icak-sele~tPon.;,.~an.. under- - 
standing of the process of historkcal selection is critical 
to understanding .why one .f.unctional-...a&ter.native and not 
another. gets .selected out, 
spec,&f icalll , ,one, must. -idenfig y.- the gnergence. o f  -.spec&f &c : - 
social practices .and .evaluating~:their-.:.consequences for 
meeting the needs,.of relevant. .actors.::- We. trade.- the . path- 
by, which social arrangements ..that;:are:".preserved .gradually 
eliminate .a.lternat ive - -modes::of :-:organi-zatkon by-:'their very 
success in meeting socia.Ll.y- .defined::.needs - .Implicit in 
this model is the learning-' prcscessc by.-which- social actors 
adopt appropriate -=,behaviors in r.esponseV.to patterned:.rewards 
and punishments. Moreover, when .taking,.a.given action 
precludes the result of .alternaDive-action forgone in 
performing the first, this becomes:a~scost which the 
individual may -weigh against the value-ofU'the rewards 
to be derived from -taking *the- fkrst:,acti.on (~omans, 1961: 
51-8 2.) . However-; ..as ..I- suggest.: below.;.- individual- awareness 
of alternative.-.courses. .of. -.ac$,ion.::.must:-.be ' taken as-.problematic 
and cannots be assumed-; .In .:summarp~;.:~~~once:-'participants n a 
social- situation -find -,.they  get^-satisfactory results from 
? 
specific behavior patterns, .ceterks.paribus; the:.selective 
principle :encouraging a,-.seac~h~~for::aBter.native practices 
5 is weakened (c. f. ..Stinchcornbe.;.-- i968 :.105) . 
In any .discussion.-..of the-..historfca~~:evolution of. 
functional alter.nati.ves ... we -must. :speckfkca*ly. examine the-. 
degree of . awareness - :of. :the .reLevant .actors-:.of -the problems 
to be solved,: the.:extent to :wh-i~h-,they~.~~re-~.aware of 
alternative solutions ..a.nd, .constraLnts:-.on:.bor.row~n~. Lack. 
of - awareness .of. the .pr.oblem..:tm8 ibe,.:sokv.ed,*:andi/dr -'alternative 
solutions. may; ':in itself ,::be..:a~:power-f.u2.:-l-facto~r ,-selecting for 
one, functional .- aEter.nativeprather .... than .another. .- It . is often 
noted that cumulative historical-experience with modern 
economic growth has given the contemporary third world 
states a wealth of alternatives from which to choose in 
solving problems relating to industrialization. Yet, the 
historical experience of a country -also imposes constraints 
on'choice. A major example isl9th-century China, which by 
virtue of the self-image of its elite saw China as the 
center of the world, with outsiders~having barbarian status. 
Consequently, it was extremely-difficult for the Chinese to 
borrow technology and especially forms -of social organization 
from the West. The ambiguity of contemporary third world 
nations toward borrowing from their ex-colonial rulers 
suggests similar constraints. In addition, much of the 
accumulated material stock of transnational resources may 
not be relevant for backward economies: Simon Kuznets 
makes a distinction between total stock o£ transnational 
resources and the relevant stock of transnational resources 
(Kuznets, 1968). This is especially relevant in the area 
of technology. In summary, the extent of awareness of 
problems and awareness of alternatives, along with the objective 
possibilities that various alternatives have in being accepted 
are important questions to be examhed by researchers. 
Structural functional analysis arose in part as a 
challenge to evolutionary theory. As a consequence a notable 
willingness to dispense with historical explanations has been 
characteristic of many structural~functionalists and led to 
the charge that -the theory was-ahistorical.. It is true that 
h i s t o r i c a l  - causes  -ar.e .contained.:kn:-.the .state of  c u r r e n t  
i n t e r a c t i o n s  by . v i r t u e  of having-'-shaped :them. I t  i s  - a l s o  
t r u e  t h a t .  t h e  opt ions . -open t o  ,..any.=.ijndividual' i n  a  g iven  
s o c i a l  s i t u a t i o n .  are determinedr'by - t h e  .state.. o f  . c u r r e n t  
i n t e r a c t i o n s  and t h e i r  r u l e s .  Based:':on . t h i s  unders tanding,  
many. ~ ~ c i o l o g i s t s  have -concentraCed-?on  explaining t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  of a  g iven  ; ' s t r u c t u r a l  . ' i t e m  .kn . t e r m s .  of - i t s  
p r e s e n t  consequences f o r  o t h e r  i t e m s  . i n  t h e  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e .  
Y e t ,  t h e  op t ions , 'open- to  'contemporary.. . a c t o r s .  a r e  a l s o  
h i s t o r i c a l  outcomes and - t h e  way -we-.:come.:to unders tand - them. 
i s  by unders tanding  t h e i r  h i s t o r k c a ~ ~ . d e v e l o p m e n t .  The 
u l t i m a t e  r a t i o n a l e  fo r  . t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a k i o n  i s  based on 
t h e  view t h a t  eve ry  ,hi.storical;-event-.that . t a k e s  p l a c e ,  i n  
p r i n c i p l e ,  shapes  t h e -  .course. .of ' aLl~ ' . subsequent  even t s .  I t  
i s -  n o t  on ly  t h a t  an  ' individual  '-s ' "behaviora l  o p t i o n s  a r e  
h i s t o r i c a l  outcomes . t h a t  . is impor tan t - :here .  An i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
" p a s t .  h i s t o r y  of succes s  . i n  h i s .<  a c t k v j t i e s  under - given  c i r -  
cumstances de te rmines  whether. h e : w i l l  .try them a g a i n ,  o r  
o t h e r s  l i k e  them, i n  s i m i l a r  c i rcumstances"  (Homans, 1967:. 
9 0 ) .  
I n .  p r a c t i c e ,  .however;. .many-':questions . .about . cu r r en t  - 
i n t e r a c t i o n s . .  can :he .answered 'that.-..do.':.not . r .equire h i s t o r i c a l  
exp lana t ions .  I f  w e ,  .want -:to ' know.:-.the :p resen t  impact  of --  t h e  
r e l i g i o n  on party.. :pref.erence:, -:we~.da:..not. .need - t o  invoke 
h i s t o r i c a l  explanation.:.:'.Zn:-.thisi.;case-, . . h s t o r i c a  exp lana t ion  
s e r v e s  - a s  an .  .".ind&r.ect ..:ca.as:e.; ". r..~hich:::is c o n t a i n e d .  i n  t h e  
c u r r e n t  s o c i a l  .~nter.actionss~::~z~E:,..,howev.er-,. w e  a s k why r e l i g i o n  . . 
is more,'highly -r-elated to..party: preference than sex, then. a 
historical explanation mukt be-invoked as a direct cause. We 
are able to answer- .this question: onlp.':by. turning to the 
historical. proces%.tt.rdt selected -~f-or:.:a:pacti.cular.~f unctional 
alternative. In .short, there '.is'.no"'one .correct approach; 
the research strategy is dictated.:by-:.the questions-which 
are chosen. 
An Empirica.1 .E.xample : .:Perrnanenk~.Employment~ ,.. :: .. :... =.: . .. . 
. .. in Japan .. . . . . 
In an effort-to .illustrate :.the:approaches suggested in 
this paper, I turn now to a.consideration of the practice of 
permanent employment in Japan. 'Few-social practices in 
Japan have - so caught:. the attentf on-,of ... American social 
scientists - as .- has the ..practice--of :-:permanent employment. 
It. is- primarily through- the work of .-.James .Abegglen (1958) 
in. his widely discussed - book-; -The. Japanese. Factory, that 
American social :scienkists - have--,become.-.aware of this 
practice (see also Odaka, 1963;-Ballon, 1969; Cole, 
1971; Marsh, 1971). 
Permanent .employment or the life time employment sys tem 
as it is sometimes :.called-'refersy:to-.the .practice by which 
male employees, especially those inM.Barge firms are hired 
upon graduation .from .school--whether :it be .middle school, 
high school or college--receive in-company training and 
remain employees .i.n the .same -.company :until the retirement 
... ...-..,- -:.  ;. ..- :age:.~E.~~Z~i.e-tyed-i-ve, This practice is , in. turn, buttressed 
1 'I 
by a wage system, nenko,. which--explicitly rewards regular 
male employess in large firms accordkng to age and length 
of servcice. This is, in effect,-a mechanism of deferred 
wage payment with younger workers being underpaid relative 
to their productivity and with 01der.workers being overpaid. 
The economic rationality of this reward structure is based 
on the expectation that employees will spend their work 
careers in one firm. 
The simplest measure of the different systems of 
employment security and different opportunity structure for 
inter-firm mobility in the United States and Japan is the 
ratio of employed persons changing jobs. This ratio is 
reported for the one-year period from 1965-1966. Table 
3 presents the findings;. The j:ob.-change..ratio f r American 
females of 6.9 per :cent is only 'sTightly higher than the 
ratio of 6.5 per cent for Japanese.'females. . Among males, 
however, the ratio of 9.9 per cent for American males, is 
more than twice as high. as the. Japanese .ratio of - 4.7 per 
cent. Looking at age-.specif ic'job2 change ratios it may 
be seen that the greatest gap among.ma.les opens up in the 
20-24.  age category where the ratio -in. the United States is 
almost four times .higher than in .Japan;..the smallest gap. 
for males occurs .fr.om age 35-54 whe~e ..the .American ratio is 
reduced to less than .twice 'as highS:as the .Japanese ratio. 
These differences £.or males in overaLl .change .ratio.. and- 
age-specif ic change. .r.atios .shou-ld -not..lead us to ignore basic 
similarities.:in .patter.n between: the-.two societies. . In both 
TABLE. 3. - - ~ a t e s  of Change. of Emp,loyment (c:omparison' between  an and, the.:  U.  S. ) : 
Rat ios  o f  -Employed Persons .  changing Jobs,  i n  a Year, ( i n -  p e r .  cent)  
. . ,  . . ( .. 
I Japan,. . .  . . U.S. .  
Age Groups I Male; ,  ~emaie ,  . . Male. Female ' 
. . . . 
More . t han ,  65 ' .  1 0.3 0 .. 3 .. 2.7: .l. 8 : 
Total . . .  
. . .  , . .- , . . > . . I  : . . . . 
1. Source : Economic- Planning ,Agency, .. 1968 : , 152. 
2 .  Rates of change of,employment..are,calculated as . fo l lows ' ;  . 
A s  . f o r .  t h e  Japanese ,  . t h e .  number of persons  ' who changed .. jobs (persons  .whose 
job ;as ':of . Ju ly .  ,1965 '.was d i f f e r e n t  ..from- t h a t .  of . a  y e a r .  ago) ' divi.ded. by t h e ,  
t o t a l  numbers of those!-who have not-.  changed. jobs and:.those'..who'. have ' chaqged 
jobs.  - As f b r  the"An&icans ; t h e  . . r a t i o  of' persbns  changi.ng jobs ,  ou t , ,  of thos& 
who were : employed bo th  i n . .  ~ a h u a r ~ .  1965  and: jahuary . . . 1 9 k 6 .  ' ,  
, . ' . m .  
.......... 
3: Age groups marked * a r e . 3 5 - 4 4 a n d  45-54, r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  f o r  t h e  Ameri,cans: 
. . .  I .  . I 
societies, the change ..r.atio.is:highest--.£or males 18-19 with 
the ratio, undergoing. gr.adua1. decZkne.::ther.eafter. ' It should 
i ' b: 
B noted that thege data do kiot'dfstingu$sh between the two < ' . . 
aivergent types . of .:j.ob; change8r - voluntary and involuntary. 
I' ; ,.. , : .  >.. . i 
I' 
: .  
In the unite$ States, high ,"voluntary quit rates are 
. . . , 
7 .  . . 
Pbrnbined with: high involuntary :-quit rates based on managerial 
k' . 
berogatives. t i j  adjust the. labor force .tp changing.. business 
I ; : 
\ :; 
bonditions ( ' I ! .  ; an institutionalized .layo££ system typifies this 
L .  :. . 
s: . 
hpproach. +: ! ~ i i e  ~merican practides--are:buttressed by a wage 
, . 
t i ! .  
e$k tem which 6xpl~icitly rewards .,productive performance. In 
\ '  , . , .
, a ;. 
8: i :  . situation where employees might;.change employmen't at any 
: :  . . 
,. . 
kkme,- . .  it is not surprising that a system .of deferred wage 
I .  
Biyment; ig unacceptable. 
1 :  
, . 
i ' : T'he . presentation . : o f -  the permanent .employment practice 
: .  
to western audiences by. Abegglen - (1958)- .has emphasized its. 
distinctive character.isti;cs (see.‘-akso':Nakane , 1970) . The 
practice seems to .symbolize all.the:uniqueness.that we.have 
come to expect from .Japan: endurf ng.-koyalty to the- corporate 
i 
group, a system of: shared obligations, and strong employee 
dependency upon powerf.ul superiors r v  ".It .confounds- the 
expectations of economists and~sociolo~ists alike.that high 
rates of job- mobility are .associated.-.wk,th .advanced levels o f  
industrialization .(.Ker-r, et a1. ,.,I964 :.17-18) . Some 
sociologists :have :even :come .to describe .the. emergent - "post- 
ndustrial society" precisely in te.rms of the temporary nature 
of individual -.p,ar.tici.pation .in-:worka:.ol;ganizations . (Bennis. ana 
I .*. .- -. 
Slater, 1968). : '1 ... - ' 
- .  
-. --:-a- 
. : ,< 
This emphasis on the uniqueness of Japanese 'practices 
is clearly,inconsistent with the approach suggested in 
this paper. A search for commonalities-.with western 
practices and: functional .alternati.ves~~.wou.ld~~seem better 
calculated to:.advance- .our understandLng:--. First., some 
clarification -is i n  order, The .permanent .employment 
practice. in Japan in. no .-way restricts ..the- .formal rights of 
employees to change employment,-..It has been established as 
a management policy to avoidas much.as- possible the discharge 
of. regular employees in large .firms -and as an. employee. 
/ 
behavioral pattern that is reinforced by .the. distribution 
of rewards according to age and 'length-of service. It is 
strengthened by;social and judiciak .pressures. A man' s 
objective performance in staying--.wLth .a .firm, . during his 
entire work career, mor.eover,. should...not. .be confused with 
his subjective hopes -and .aspirationso:. . =Col.e (1971:131-135) 
presents case- study..datp .showing .that this -objective- 
performance of-ten conf.licts,-wi th:::individual .aspirations, 
for job changing .' Marsh-. (19 7.1) :.-r.eports .case study . data 
showing the.. acceptabi.1.i.t~ 'of the- .noEms and. .values of job 
chanqing among--employees , .T.hese-..data. .suggest that examina- 
tion of the str.uctural~~factors.~.af.fecting .availability. of 
employment opportunities rather. .than. :a. mystical "tradition" . 
is.a more useful approach to decomposing .the meaning of 
permanent employment, In James AbeggLen's discussion of 
the permanent employment practice,.-we are given little in 
the way of dynamics either historicalkyj-or in.contemporary 
practice. permanent -.employment :.is -presented .as 'arising out 
of Japanese tradition and .as .having :.adapted itself, to modern 
needs. Much .doubt -has already tbeen;'cast .on Abegglen' s 
historical treatment (.T.aira , .19.6.2..;.-:.Odaka,. 1.1963; Sumiya, 
1966, Cole, forthcoming);-- There-.was apparently considerably 
more variation of mobility rates-historically than can be 
-accounted for by simple reference:to--the enduring strength 
of Japanese tradition. I will not-,discuss here either the 
historical evolution of the permanent employment practice or 
contemporary pressures for change. Rather I want simply to 
concentrate on present structural arrangements with their 
characteristic law rates of,inter-firm mobility relative to 
, . the United States .and -ask how. .we .-may- .conceptualize. the 
Japanese arrangements so .as to 'best -.understand them, 
As advanced i ndustrial soc,ieties,. :both Japan and the 
United States manA£es.t - .str.ati.fication -systems involving. a 
complex division of .Labor with individuals r.anged.according 
to a hierarchy of occupational skills.. .A.continual need of 
both. societies. consequentky .i.s::to .moti.va.te ..individuals to 
train for, occupy .and per.form-: these :occupational roles. The 
rapidity of technolog.i.ca1 :innovat.i;on ;in. both' .socketies with 
the - rapid obsolescence of occupational. .skills means that 
these problems are not solved :upon. initial .entry to the 
labor force but must be continually,:dealt.with. Insofar as 
both societies di.splay .an-.ability .to:.operate complex. technologies 
and improve. on them.,. .we may,.see ... the: -dif.f.erent :structural arrange- 
ments regulating -empLoy.men-t .securiky::..and 'opportunity for 
inter-firm mobility as func t iona l - ' . ak t e rna t ives .  That is, 
using different arrangements for employment security and 
allowing differing opportunity-for.-inter-firm obility, 
both societies succeed in motiQating individuals to train 
for, occupy and perform the nbcessary occupational roles 
which keep their advanced tecHnolog.ies operative. 
To note that at this gdieral .level, the two different 
institutional approaches to employment -security and 
opportunity for employee inter-firm mobility are functional 
alternatives does not entireiy capture the degree of 
similarity and dissimiliarity of Japanese practices with 
western practices. More. detafled..comparisori is necessary. 
The basic core ofthe permanent--employment system is 
present 'in any ongoing :industrial society.. .The-reason 
does.not lie in common traditson or culture but in the 
fundamental nature labor market,.arrangements. To be 
successful and persist, all productive units try to keep 
to a minimum the r e p l a c e m e n t ~ a n d t e r m i n a t i o n  costs-arising 
from- employee turnover? .It is"especial1y important to commit 
to the firm key -persons - upon whom.'the. enterprise is dependent, 
such as- skilled .worker.s and abZe..'manag.ement executives. 
Devices must exist which penalkze movement out of the 
firm; otherwise .r.ecr.ui-tment ;screening.,. .training and 
termination costs :would .prove unmanageable. The greater 
the skill requirements .and 'thet'scarcer .-the skills, the 
more impor.tant -..this .becomes 'to-:the ..employer.. On .the other 
side, workers devel.op~.psychological~:and economic stakes in 
their employment; Labor market. arr.ang.ements must guarantee 
some degree of employment tenure -if they 'are to successfully 
motivate workers. Empldyees tend--to:prefer some system of 
internal replacement add upgrading "since .the opportunity 
costs of inter-enterprise mobility generally exceed zero. 
The kinds of elaborations that ar.e bult on this core 
structure depend :on-.the political,'-socf a1 .and. cultural. 
. . .  . 
heritage of a given.,coiintry and 'its 'sp,ecific industrial 
structure and labor market situation;. . The strength of 
the Japanese approach in crystallizing a practice of 
permanent employment 'for selected .employees is that it 
places a high premium on the resouree of employee loyalty 
and the benefits that flow to the orgafiization from 
mobilizing this loyalty (see Whitehill and Takezawa, 
1966). This may be seen as a tradeoff for the strengths 
associated with Arrierican practices. The strength of the 
American practice of maintaining hi-gh rates of inter-firm 
mobility is that .it -provides for-'quick .readjustment of 
labor pools, and skills .to meet employer needs and the 
benefits that- flow .to the organization .f.r.om obilizing 
external sources of -tr.ained labor;' ".Workers may also find 
. . 
it easier to .moue .to .:alternative .empl.oyers should. they be 
dissatisfied with their .present empl;oyer,..thus making 
possible a better £.it between employer and employee. 
The greater. .constr.ictfon :of :tihe:..l;abor market in Japan, 
with its . p a r . t i c u L a r . - ~ - ~ o ~ g h ~ ~ . n o ~ ~ : e x e ~ ~ s - ~ ~ e - - . ~ ~ ~ h ~ ~  is on 
i < i .  
- . recruitment at 'time of scho01'grXduatfon~~-and retention of 
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employees, reduces the flexibility,of Japanese employers. 
But it also permits Japanese employers to avoid the endemic 
instabilities apparent in- America, -as manifested in high 
turnover rates, poor returns on training costs, high cost 
of recruitment and termination and seemingly high levels of 
alienation. 8 
A better way to conceptualize these differences between 
the two societies is suggested by the recent work of Piore 
and Doeringer (1971) .' They are concerned with the existence 
of internal labor markets by administrative units such as 
manufacturing plants. Within these- units, administrative 
rules and procedures govern the pricing and allocation of 
labor. This internal labor market.is connected to the 
external labor market by certasn job classifications which 
constitute ports of entry and exit'-to and from the internal 
labor market. The remainder of the jobs are shielded from 
the direct influence of competitive forces in the external 
market and are filled by the promotion .or transfer of 
workers who have already gained--entry. Viewed- from- this 
framework it seems that in Japan.the ports of entry and 
exit and the -traffi.c...volume of'these .ports is more limited 
than in the United States. At issue- .is ..the .rigidity of 
the rules which define the boundarses .of internal markets 
and which govern allocation of the-=-work force. The greater 
rigidity of the rules in Japan-enables us to speak of more 
closed internal markets in the large:-industrial firms of 
Japan and more open internal markets'-in the United States. 
-34- 
. 
Piore and Doeringer :(1971: 6)- -note -that-the rigidity of. the 
internal market. is. :associated-.with:..i.nves.tment i  enterprise 
specific human capital, on-the-job -training, and the role 
of labor as a fixed or quasi-fixedafactor of production. 
These characteristics loom,especia-lLy :large in Japan 
(see Somers and Tsuda, 1966:195-236,--esp.. 207). . The greater 
role that seniority plays-in the pricing and allocation of 
labor in Japan also becomes understandable in this context. 
10 
Rather than emphasizing the uniqueness of nenko and its basis 
in Japanese tradition, we may speak-of the importance of 
seniority in a situation in which workers have less recourse 
to the market in highly structured internal markets. The 
important point here ,is not that internal markets are 
unique to Japan but that they seem-to be more closed than 
those which exist in comparable industrial units in the 
The Japanese real economic- growth rate, was about three 
times as high as the.American rate-during-the period from 
*. . 
1955 to 1.970. This..has meant ,an enormous capacity of 
Japanese society to .absorb massive technological innovation. 
In. a recent four :year. .period (1966-1969). ,. .private equipment 
investment expanded at #the-remarkable.average rate of 26 per 
cent a- year (Ec0nomi.c .Planning .Agency;. .1.9.7.0 : 15-16 ) . 
permanent -.empLoyment .ipr.actices..have :certainly been a major 
factor in rea1izing:thks .capacity-.t;hrough minimizing dis- 
locations ,and .excessive costs to :.individuals and business 
firms alike :which :would-:l'ikely~'resuLt;:f+~am .high rates of job 
changing. This success, is dependent in,turn upon the high 
developed' in-plank- tzaining *and .retraining programs that 
have characterized Japanese business .firms. In a recent 
article, Peter Drucker (1971:llO-122)' has suggested that 
American managers have much to learn from Japanese company 
practices of providing "contfnuous training" for employees. 
The permanent employment system avoi'ds much of the waste 
associated with employee and union resistance to technological 
innovation deriving from threats to employment security, such 
as has characterized the United States. When employees are 
relatively confident that they will retain their employment 
and be given the opportunity for-job retraining, they can 
be. expected to reduce :their .opposLtfon .:to .technological 
< 
innovation. This is ..e~.~ecia&ly. *true-.:where .there exists a 
wage system such as :Japan ' s ~hich:~,f.s...not,- .directly occupation- 
ally based. Similarly, enipPoyers::can undertake extensive 
training of their ,employees, 'with"'Pess.:fear of - losing their 
investment through-.inter-firm.mobility., 
I- first suggested :that we-.may speak .of functional 
alternatives between .Japan- and- the-.United .States with 
respect to the role. .played .by' the-.:diEf.er.ing structural 
arrangements regulating .employment. security and opportunity 
for inter-£ irm mobi.lity.: In both:-.societies, these differing- 
structural arrangements succeed.'fn motivating individuals 
to train for, occupy .and .performthe. necessary occupational 
roles which are neces.sar.y to the-.respective advanced 
economies. M0r.e .detaBled -compar.i-son ,. .however ,. showed 
some important &if-fer:ences ; - -The -.permanent .employment 
practice in Japan is .suppor'tedq'by--extensive company training 
programs and it has distinctive: consequences for mobilizing 
employee loyalty to the- -firm'.~:.~roduction .g als. These 
underpinnings- and consequences .-are .nofie-.present - in the American 
system to the same:degree..' Thus.;*--'a,-focus .on a wider set of 
consequences fkowkng-:fl=oni these-.dkfEerLng .structural arrange-. 
ments leads u's to recognize some'-key-.:differences in their 
precondit-ions and .consequences .. ;- :In ..summary, - by working 
both from the initial. .conceptua2ization- of ..functional. 
al~ternatives. BB well as., examininc?~ <the.-:.possibility of
equivalence.bver a-..wider set of consequences,.~ suggest- 
we are better able.:to understand..-&he -.dif-ferent processes. 
operative in the two- societies. 
In -this paper- :I. .have tried:.:to-:suggest the importance 
of functional alternatives 'as..an.*ana.tytical .construct. 
Its importance lies in its ability to.serve as an alternative- 
to sociological explanations. which':emphasize. the polar posi- 
tions of cultural .and :structura~'~uniqueness .orcultural and 
structural. univer-sals .. The task, 3s- .to -establish- how different 
structural arrangements .or 'value--systems may have the same 
consequences for the -Larger systems -ine.which they are 
implicated. . WhiLe..per.fect  equivalence-.^^ .not to be expected, 
. .. .  - - the heuris.t&g. v&lae'.'"~f ' ~ ~ y p o t ~ e ~ ~ i - ~ ~ ~ ~ - - ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ O . n a . ~  a.lternatives 
is great. 
To understand.why one ratherkhan..another functional 
C 
alternative becomes :estabf ished-r.equk.res historical analysis. 
At present, many ~soci.o~ogists -are-.still .trying to establish 
the degree of cornrnona.lity- in:'structur.al .outcomes at given 
levels of industriali.zation; It; ~ 5 3 . 2 .  :be:.necessary- to go 
beyond this to examine ~.these"structu~al rrangements, whether 
similar or different, and ascertakn*.their basis for coming 
into existence, and ..the basis -for',thekr. maintenance. 
1. Clark Kerr and his: .assockakes -: (-19.6.4.). are ..commonly. 
identified with -the . ~ o n v d r ~ e n c e ~ : : . ~ o s i t i o n  wh le
Reinhard Bendix . (.196.4) is-"one..-o5:.the oukstanding 
critics,  or. some-..~uhbna?~ .statements .of the contro- 
versy see Weinberg (19$8~, ~o~dthor.~e (1966) , Feldman 
and Moore (1969.), and Meyer (T970). 
2. See paunce (.197.0.::-41.8 ) .  for a .-discussion of these issues. 
3. The problem with .this- ..assertkon=:i-s .that the- researchers 
have not. examined .a ..variety. :.of .'.other. - va.r.iables such - as 
educational. level. that might--.explai;n. .some. -significant. 
portion of the variance : Given-'-the- .difficulty- of know- 
ing whether - all r.elevant~.variab~kes- :have- been considered, 
it is not clear how :useful itvPs-Co .speak of having. [ 
identified. the ".di.f ferent secondary~~social bases of 
political cleavage." 
4. Robert Bellahl.s .r.etr.action-- ( BelZah,,.- 1963) of his. original 
claim to have found-a'-counterpa~t-?.to the Protestant Ethic 
in the religion-,of. 'Tokugawa. Japan. .:(:Bellah, - 1957) '.stems 
directgy from his *lack. of .clarfty:-in .specifying the content 
of the Western model. in his orjlginal.:statement. 
5. For a discussion of an, empiricalcase utilizing this 
strategy see Cole .(forthcoming). 
6. Defining history in a narrow sense.one may argue that 
a non-experimental observational-basis for a science 
is always historical insofar-as. causal explanation 
involves ascertaining the temporal priority of causal 
factors (Karl Popper, 1957:38-39). 
We should be .cautious 'about .:seeing..- the .United States as 
the model of khe-'.industrkaI-nakfon .which. must be 
emulated if moder.nity is to-,:.be achieved.. If we compare, 
labor turnover rates .(.a more fnd.irect measure of job 
mobility) in manuf.acturing of '::gapan .with. England. and 
West Germany, .i.t .appears the. Japanese rate is only 
slightly lower (OECD, 1965.:503:: .-Perhaps. students- of 
Japanese conditions ought'to':be':comparing their findings 
to the unique labor. 'market- tradition of. the United States. 
8 .  Fo-r an analysis :on -the Arnerfcanr.scene,. see Stanley 
Lebergott (1968 :122-127). 
9. See also Dunlop (1966). 
10. The more important.role pkayed::.by .seniority in Japanese 
industry .as compared to . the--U:.;.S.i- - has .been pointed out 
by numerous .observers. 'See-whitehill and. Takezawa 
(1968 :127-156.) .. 
11. This thesis should not be 'exaggerated, however, 
public opinion polls, for example, show a less than 
favorable attitude by the Japanese public toward the 
impact of technology (Ishida; 1971:98). Cole (1971: 
92-100) reports case study data-documenting employee 
restriction of production. Viewed from the American 
side, it has been noted in American industry as well 
that employment- guarantees are associated with con- 
siderable managerial freedom to-modify jobs and to 
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